

CLOVIS CITY COUNCIL MEETING

March 4, 2025

6:00 P.M.

Council Chamber

Meeting called to order by Mayor Mouanoutoua at **6:00**
Flag Salute led by Councilmember Bessinger

Roll Call: Present: Councilmembers Ashbeck, Basgall, Bessinger,
Mayor Pro Tem Pearce, and Mayor Mouanoutoua

PRESENTATION – 6:05

6:05 – ITEM 1 – Presentation of Proclamation Declaring March 7, 2025, as Arbor Day.

6:11 – ITEM 2 - Presentation of Proclamation Honoring the Liberta Family for Owning and Operating Luna's Pizzeria and Italian Restaurant for over 50 Years in Old Town Clovis.

PUBLIC HEARING – Item to be heard at 6:05 p.m.

6:18 – ITEM 3 - Consider various actions related to the fifth public hearing on the city's transition to district-based elections:

Mayor Mouanoutoua acknowledged for the record that a written comment was received.

Steven Trevino, resident, expressed concerns about outsiders submitting maps for Clovis, questioned why certain streets weren't used in mapping, and mentioned socioeconomic differences in different areas.

Eric Rollins, resident, supported draft Map 508, citing its division of apartment buildings and homeowners, and its preservation of Old Town Clovis as a single district.

Brian Wilson, resident, asked about the numbering of districts on the maps, questioned how election cycles would be assigned, and supported draft Map 507.

Susan Patterson, resident, supported draft Map 508, favoring its division for socioeconomic diversity to maintain Clovis' culture.

Orlando, resident, supported draft Maps 508 and 502, emphasizing Clovis' long-standing community spirit and unity despite transitioning to district elections.

ITEM 3A. Review Draft District Maps, Select Final Map, and Determine Election Sequence.

Motion by Councilmember Ashbeck, seconded by Councilmember Bessinger to approve draft map 502 with district renumbering as follows: Districts up for election in 2026 will be District 1 (formerly District 3 on the map), District 4 (formerly District 1), and District 5 (formerly District 2). Districts 2

(formerly District 5) and 3 (formerly District 4) will be up for election in 2028. The motion carried 4-1 vote, with Mayor Pro Tem Pearce voting no.

ITEM 3B. Consider Introduction – **Ord. 25-02**, An Ordinance of the City Council of the City of Clovis Adding Chapter 1.10 to Title 1 of the Clovis Municipal Code to Establish By-District Elections for Five Council Members, Define District Boundaries, and Schedule the Order of Elections for Each District.

Motion by Councilmember Ashbeck, seconded by Councilmember Bessinger to approve the introduction of an Ordinance of the City Council of the City of Clovis Adding Chapter 1.10 to Title 1 of the Clovis Municipal Code to Establish By-District Elections for Five Council Members, Define District Boundaries, and Schedule the Order of Elections for Each District. Motion carried by unanimous vote.

PUBLIC COMMENTS – 6:02

Co-Chair Avereet Samra and Secretary Jasmine Parmer of the Youth Commission invited the Council and community to the Cowboy Cleanup event on March 29, 2025.

Jesus Garcia, resident, expressed concerns about increasing traffic and speeding on Bullard Avenue near Willow.

CONSENT CALENDAR – 7:34

Upon call, there was no public comment.

Motion by Councilmember Ashbeck, seconded by Councilmember Bessinger, that the items on the Consent Calendar be approved. Motion carried by unanimous vote.

4. Administration - Approval - Minutes from the February 18, 2025, Regular Council Meeting, and the February 24, 2025, Special Council Meeting.
5. Administration – Approval – **Res. 25-16**, Approving an application in the amount of \$1,500,000 to the California State Department of Housing and Community Development for funding under the CalHome Program; and Authorizing the City Manager, or designee, to sign the application, execute the Standard Agreement, any Amendments, and any related documents thereto, if selected for funding, as may be necessary to participate in the CalHome Program as identified in the 2024 Homeownership Super Notice of Funding Availability dated December 12, 2024.
6. General Services – Approval - **Res. 25-17**, Adopting Amendments to the Deputy City Engineer Salary Schedule.
7. General Services – Approval – **Res. 25-18**, Amending the City's FY 2024-2025 Position Allocation Plan by adding three (3) Police Officer/Recruits, one (1) Animal Control Officer, one (1) Community Service Officer, and one (1) Police Records Specialist I position within the Police Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS – 7:36

7:36 ITEM 8 - Workshop - Community Facilities District (CFD) for maintenance services.

Eric Rollins, resident, addressed concerns about the potential use of Measure Y funds for purposes other than police and fire services.

The council directed staff to move forward with the Resolution of Intention for the formal CFD formation process, including setting boundaries and tax rates. Staff will continue communication with the development community and will return to Council with the Resolution once the work is finalized. A hybrid approach was suggested, where the council would receive a high-level update on progress before finalizing the Resolution of Intention, to allow for feedback.

8:32 ITEM 9 - Provide Direction – Discussion and guidance on defining the criteria and establishing the Measure Y Oversight Committee.

Orlando, resident, addressed the responsibility of elected officials to honor their commitments, particularly in terms of fulfilling their duties for the entire city and ensuring public safety, while acknowledging the challenges in balancing budgets for police, fire, and other city needs.

Eric Rollins, resident, expressed concerns about the potential misuse of Measure Y funds and emphasized the need for clear direction and guidelines for the committee, while also offering to serve on it.

Susan Patterson, resident, expressed her interest in being on the Measure Y oversight committee.

The Council directed staff to move forward with the establishment of the Measure Y Oversight committee and to include the following criteria. **Committee Formation:** The committee will consist of five members, with one member appointed by each Councilmember through interviews and ideally representing their respective districts. The only qualification for members is that they must be residents of Clovis. A formal application process will be created for those interested in serving on the committee. **Committee's Role:** It will act as a reporting body to confirm that Measure Y funds are used as intended, focusing on oversight rather than offering recommendations for new initiatives. **Length of Term:** Members will serve at the pleasure of the Councilmember who appoints them. The committee will be governed by the Brown Act and will be formed through an ordinance. It will meet twice a year during the first year—likely in December, and either June or July—and then annually thereafter. The committee will remain active for the duration of Measure Y funding. **Scope of the Committee:** The committee's scope will be determined after the budget hearings and the five-year forecast.

9:10 ITEM 10 - Consider various actions associated with CIP 16-19, the State Route 168/Enterprise Canal Pedestrian Bridge Project, east of Temperance Avenue and south of Owens Mountain Parkway.

Orlando, resident, addressed the importance of community involvement and potential philanthropic support in challenging projects, while emphasizing the need for careful consideration of public safety, particularly in high-traffic areas.

9:10 ITEM 10A - Consider Approval - **Res. 25-19**, A resolution of the City Council adopting an environmental finding of a negative declaration as a responsible agency under CEQA Guidelines Section 15381.

Motion for approval by Councilmember Ashbeck, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem Pearce. Motion carried by unanimous vote.

9:10 ITEM 10B - Consider Approval - A request for the City Council to approve the completed Phase 1 of the project consisting of preliminary design, architectural aesthetics evaluation study, preliminary geotechnical investigation, environmental clearance, and community outreach meetings.

Motion for approval by Councilmember Ashbeck, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem Pearce. Motion carried by unanimous vote.

9:10 ITEM 10C - Consider Approval – A request for the City Council to approve terminating Phase 2 of the project consisting of right of way acquisition, and final design including plans, specifications, and estimate.

Motion for approval by Councilmember Bessinger, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem Pearce. Motion carried by 3-2 vote, with Councilmember Ashbeck and Mayor Mouanoutoua voting no.

CITY MANAGER COMMENTS – 9:47

City Manager Haussler announced several updates, including the Meet the Mayor and City Manager event on March 6, 2025, at 6 p.m. at the Clovis Transit Center, encouraged sign-ups for the Youth Commission Cowboy cleanup on March 29, 2025, at 8 am., gave a shout-out to the Public Utilities team for a successful compost giveaway, and the Fire Department's installation of 167 smoke alarms at a mobile home park. He also noted that Council meetings would return to Mondays starting next week.

COUNCIL COMMENTS – 9:48

There was consensus of the Council to direct staff to review SB 496 and, if necessary, to approach the Mayor for a letter of support if there is a time-sensitive need.


There was consensus of the Council to support sending a letter of opposition to AB 1333, restricting rights of self-defense in homes, pending further review by the Police Chief Fleming.

There was consensus of the Council to support sending a letter of opposition to SB 554, related to the interaction between County Sheriffs and immigration authorities.

ADJOURNMENT

Mayor Mouanoutoua adjourned the meeting of the Council to March 10, 2025.

Meeting adjourned: 10:03 p.m.


Mayor


City Clerk



Briana Parra

From: City of Clovis Website <wp-donotreply@ci.clovis.ca.us>
Sent: Monday, March 3, 2025 5:31 AM
To: Andrew Haussler; Rebecca Simonian; Briana Parra
Subject: [External] Public Comment for City Council

Council Meeting Date: 2025-03-04

Item Number (put "0" if your comment is regarding an item not on the agenda): 3

Full Name: Rachel Youdelman

Email: rachel27@berkeley.edu

Comment: Regarding draft maps for district-based elections, my preference is for #501, based on the division of neighborhoods.

The statistical information accompanying the maps reveals that Clovis is mostly white, the population is generally not well educated and appears to be widely under-employed. Only white residents are invested in voting, and most residents own a single-family house --all of which I found interesting.

Supporting Files (2 Max.):

Date: March 3, 2025

Time: 5:30 am

Remote IP: 67.181.166.166

Briana Parra

From: City of Clovis Website <wp-donotreply@ci.clovis.ca.us>
Sent: Tuesday, March 4, 2025 9:27 AM
To: Andrew Haussler; Rebecca Simonian; Briana Parra
Subject: [External] Public Comment for City Council

Council Meeting Date: 2025-03-04

Item Number (put "0" if your comment is regarding an item not on the agenda): 3

Full Name: Jerry & Martha Philipp

Email: jerry.philipp@gmail.com

Comment: My wife and I support proposed map 503, five districts and the mayor chosen by the City Council.

Martha & Jerry Philipp

2271 Alamos Ave.

Clovis, CA 93611

Supporting Files (2 Max.):

Date: March 4, 2025

Time: 9:26 am

Remote IP: 108.89.165.49

Briana Parra

From: City of Clovis Website <wp-donotreply@ci.clovis.ca.us>
Sent: Tuesday, March 4, 2025 10:00 AM
To: Andrew Haussler; Rebecca Simonian; Briana Parra
Subject: [External] Public Comment for City Council

Council Meeting Date: 2025-03-04

Item Number (put "0" if your comment is regarding an item not on the agenda): 3

Full Name: Patty Cassio

Email: pcassio@jbs.org

Comment: Agenda Item 3: District Map 508

As a Clovis Resident, i would request Council Approve District Map 508. Thank you!

Patty Cassio

Supporting Files (2 Max.):

Date: March 4, 2025

Time: 9:59 am

Remote IP: 172.12.152.226

Briana Parra

From: City of Clovis Website <wp-donotreply@ci.clovis.ca.us>
Sent: Tuesday, March 4, 2025 11:31 AM
To: Andrew Haussler; Rebecca Simonian; Briana Parra
Subject: [External] Public Comment for City Council

Council Meeting Date: 2025-03-04

Item Number (put "0" if your comment is regarding an item not on the agenda): 3

Full Name: Molly Analla

Email: MollyA.Volunteer@gmail.com

Comment: After careful consideration of all maps submitted, I am supporting Map 508. I hope the City Council chooses this map to represent this great city! This map takes into consideration everything the city council has asked a map to do. Thank you!

Supporting Files (2 Max.):

Date: March 4, 2025

Time: 11:30 am

Remote IP: 99.3.107.159



CALIFORNIA NULLIFIERS DEFY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

From: Joseph P Thompson (translaw@pacbell.net)

To: info@garrybredefeld.com; mike.karbassi@fresno.gov; david@davidtangipaforassembly.com;
assemblymember.tangipa@outreach.assembly.ca.gov; rosalinda.alexander@asm.ca.gov

Date: Tuesday, February 25, 2025 at 06:30 PM PST

Received

FEB 28 2025

ADMN/CITYMGR

All Council:

PUBLIC COMMENT: NEXT MEETING; REAL OR VIRTUAL; REGULAR OR SPECIAL; STUDY SESSION OR PUBLIC WORKSHOP

Dear Friends,

If I swear to uphold the Constitution, can I choose which parts of it to which I agree, or have I sworn to uphold all of it? Can local elected officials nullify those parts of the Constitution to which they disagree? What does history teach us? Did the original 13 States ratify all of the Constitution, or only parts of it? Did subsequent States? California in 1850—all of the Constitution, or just the parts with which they agreed? Nullifiers in the State of South Carolina were shown by President Jackson, and taught by Senator Webster, what it means to be a nation of laws.

So, today, is it "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR, UNITED STATES OF CALIFORNIA?"

Under our federal Constitution's Supremacy Clause, federal law trumps contrary inferior law, e.g., County ordinances, locals decisions to nullify federal law.

During debate on the South Carolina attempt at nullification of federal law, Senator Daniel Webster, in his famous **Second Reply to Senator Hayne**, gave his immortal position defending the action of the federal government.

When Arkansas elected officials attempted to thwart federal law regarding desegregation, and the Arkansas Governor called out the National Guard to help prevent black school children from attending public school, on 9-5-1957 President Eisenhower invoked the power of the federal government, saying to Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, "The only assurance I can give you is that the Federal Constitution will be upheld by me by every legal means at my command."

President Eisenhower emphatically said that we must uphold federal law against those who seek to nullify it.

"You and other state officials—as well as the National Guard which, of course, is uniformed, armed and partially sustained by the Government—will, I am sure, give full cooperation to the United States District Court."

signed Dwight D. Eisenhower.

He sent Army Airborne troops to back-up his telegram to Arkansas' nullifiers. And despite local government opposition to desegregation, federal law prevailed.

Today we see California "nullifiers" like our Governor, Attorney General, and some municipal elected officials defying our Nation's federal immigration law.

Are we the United States of America, or, the United States of California?

Will you please convey to all my friends in local government, City and County, my prayer that they follow our Nation's historic adherence to paramount federal law as seen in Webster's famous **Second Reply to Hayne**, and in President Eisenhower's telegram to the Governor of Arkansas, when South Carolina, and later Arkansas, tried to nullify our federal law. While the Governor, our Attorney General, and some municipal elected officials may disagree with our federal law, they must obey it regardless of their personal beliefs.

President Eisenhower said, what we must say to those who disagree with federal law, including County Supervisors in all California Counties, "When I became President, I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States." So, too, have the Supervisors of the Counties of California, and municipal government leaders.

When predicting the outcome of pending federal complaint against Illinois and Chicago first read Madison's explanation of the Drafters debates in Philadelphia in 1787 on the meaning of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, which you can find in The Federalist Papers, No. 44. Such a complaint against California's nullifiers must adhere to the

same demands of federal preemption.

Thank you.

✓ Joseph P. Thompson
Past-President, Gilroy-Morgan Hill Bar Assn.
(408) 848-5506



EISENHOWER telegram to Arkansas Gov Faubus 9-5-1957.pdf
231.6kB



US v ILL 2-6-2025 BIG PRINT COMPLAINT.pdf
264.5kB



Webster 2nd Reply to Hayne 1830.pdf
3.3MB



Federalist No. 44

Federalist No. 44 is an essay by James Madison, the forty-fourth of *The Federalist Papers*. It was first published by *The New York Packet* on January 25, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all *The Federalist* papers were published. This essay addresses the Constitution's limitation of the power of individual states, something strongly decried by the Anti-Federalists, who sought a greater degree of sovereignty for the states. It is titled "**Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States**".^[1]

Overview


In this essay, Madison justifies many parts of the Constitution, specifically those sections which limit the powers of the states, give Congress full authority to execute its powers and establish the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.

His discussion begins with article 1, section 10 (which limits the powers of individual states), wherein he justifies the outlawing of state sponsored privateering as consistent with not allowing states to conduct their own foreign policy, which could lead to great mischief.

He then expounds upon why states should not be allowed to mint their own currencies or issue paper money, saying that multiple currencies would cause confusion and discrepancies, hurt citizens and fuel animosity between the states. He condemns the state issuance of paper money by citing the problems caused by this after the peace in 1783 (paper money issued by the states led to runaway inflation).

Madison vigorously defends the outlawing of bills of attainder, ex post facto laws and laws impairing the obligations of contracts. He insists that such laws would contradict basic principles of sound legislation, and of the social compact itself by allowing a capricious congress to remove basic individual rights and security.

Federalist No. 44



James Madison, author of Federalist No. 44

Author	<u>James Madison</u>
Original title	<i>Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States</i>
Language	English
Series	<i>The Federalist</i>
Publisher	<i>New York Packet</i>
Publication date	January 25, 1788
Publication place	United States
Media type	Newspaper
Preceded by	<i>Federalist No. 43</i>
Followed by	<i>Federalist No. 45</i>

Madison then argues at length for the Necessary and Proper Clause, noting that no part of the constitution had come under more attack. He states flatly that the clause is "invulnerable" and that without it the constitution would be a "dead letter." He says that the Constitution might have listed or enumerated those necessary and proper powers or attempted to list those that were expressly not necessary and proper, but argues that either exercise would have been futile in that no list could ever fully take into account all of the nation's present and future concerns.

He responds to critics who feared that the clause would allow the government to overstep its powers that the people would have the same redress to this as to any occasion on which the legislature abused its powers: the balance of the executive and legislative branches, and the potential to remove the offending legislators via the ballot box.

Madison similarly defends the supremacy clause as vital to the functioning of the nation. He notes that state legislatures were invested with all powers not specifically defined in the constitution, but also said that having the federal government subservient to various state constitutions would be an inversion of the principles of government, comparing it to having the brain subservient to limbs of the body.

Finally he speaks to the importance of having both state and federal legislators and judicial officers swear an oath to the constitution, noting that the federal government is dependent upon the states to carry out policy

References

1. Madison, James (January 25, 1788). "Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States" (<https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-44>). U.S. Congress. Retrieved September 2, 2017.

External links

- Text of The Federalist No. 44 (<https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-44>): [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov)

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Federalist_No._44&oldid=1252383776"



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
Federalist No. 33

Federalist No. 33, written by Alexander Hamilton and first published in *The Independent Journal* on January 2, 1788,^[1] continues the focus on the issues in creating an efficient taxation system, along with reassuring the people's doubts about the government control over taxation. Titled "**The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation**", No. 33 explores the idea of allowing Congress to make all laws that are necessary for efficiently operating the national government. Under the pseudonym, Publius, John Jay, Hamilton, and James Madison collectively wrote and published eighty-five essays in the New York newspaper between 1787 and 1788 (later published as a book called *The Federalist Papers* in 1788) to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution.

Controversies

Hamilton notes that the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause "have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution." This stirs up much of the issues amongst the people due to the uncertainty of the consequences of granting the government "too much power". He argues that the first clause is implicit in the constitution—if congress is granted a power, it must necessarily be able to draft laws that enable it to execute that power. Hamilton then applies this line of logic to the issue of taxation, stating that Congress must have the power to create legislation to collect taxes. The people's reluctance is understandable, considering their recent break from Great Britain. Hamilton ridicules the anti-federalist alarmism about giving the national government more power, writing that the national government has "been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane..."

Federalist No. 33



Alexander Hamilton, author of Federalist No. 33

Author	<u>Alexander Hamilton</u>
Original title	<i>The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation</i>
Language	English
Series	<i>The Federalist</i>
Publisher	<i>The Independent Journal</i>
Publication date	January 2, 1788
Publication place	United States
Media type	Newspaper
Preceded by	<i>Federalist No. 32</i>
Followed by	<i>Federalist No. 34</i>

This quote expresses Hamilton's frustration for the people's inability to hear him out and truly understand the reasoning and importance for the two clauses because these legislations and clauses are stated specifically to avoid anyone from being able to nitpick and find loopholes, and without anyone enforcing it, it would just be a treaty.

He poses the question of why the clause should be included if its power is implicit. He answers by saying that the clause is included "to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel the disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union," in other words, to guard against those who would seek to evade the authority of the Union by an overly literal interpretation of the constitution. In his essay he states that "'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers by that Constitution vested in the government of the United States...and the treaties made by their authority shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'" Hamilton proceeds to clarify and explain the clause and the purpose it serves in detail in order to assuage all conflict and fear.

His response to a potential abuse of these powers is that the government must be responsible for the proper exercise of its powers, but ultimately the people themselves must hold the government to account. "If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify."

Hamilton similarly argues that the Supremacy Clause is simply an assurance that the government's powers can be properly executed, saying that a law itself implies supremacy, and without supremacy, it would amount to nothing. He returns to the example of taxation, stating that the supremacy of the constitution as the law of the land did not preclude states from independently raising their own taxes as necessary, except for duties on imports and exports. Hamilton's intentions were to assuage any uncertainty, hesitancy or fear amongst the people. He does so by explicitly going over the main purpose of the two controversial clauses. He makes sure that the audience understands that this will not take away their liberty, but instead will strengthen the ability of the government to effectively eliminate any issues presented in the future.

Hamilton concludes by saying that this concurrent jurisdiction in the realm of taxation was the only acceptable substitute to complete federal control, an idea he expounds upon in Federalist No. 34.

See also

- Article Six of the United States Constitution
 - Supremacy Clause

References

1. "The Federalist No. 33 (2 January 1788)" (<https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0190>). [archives.gov](https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0190). Retrieved July 10, 2020.

External links

- Text of The Federalist No. 33 (<https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-33>): congress.gov
 - The Federalist No. 33 Text (<http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa33.htm>)
-

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Federalist_No._33&oldid=1146797619"

1 BRETT A. SHUMATE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
2 Civil Division
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AUGUST FLENTJE
4 Deputy Director
EREZ REUVENI
5 Assistant Director
6 Office of Immigration Litigation
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Director
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Assistant Director
10 ELISABETH J. NEYLAN
Trial Attorney
11 Federal Programs Branch
12 *Attorneys for the United States*

13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
14 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
15 EASTERN DIVISION

16 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

17 Plaintiff,

18 v.

19 STATE OF ILLINOIS; JB PRITZKER,
Governor of Illinois, in his Official
20 Capacity; THE CITY OF CHICAGO;
21 BRANDON JOHNSON, Mayor of
Chicago, in his Official Capacity; LARRY
22 SNELLING, Chicago Police
Superintendent, in his Official Capacity;
23 COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS; COOK
COUNTY BOARD OF
24 COMMISSIONERS; TONI
25 PRECKWINKLE, President of the Cook
County Board of Commissioners, in her
26 Official Capacity; THOMAS J. DART,
27 Cook County Sheriff, in his Official
Capacity,

28 Defendants.

No. 1:25-cv-1285

COMPLAINT

1 Plaintiff, the United States of America, by and through its undersigned counsel, brings
2 this civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief, and alleges as follows:

3 **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

- 4 1. Within hours of assuming the Presidency, President Trump declared a “national
5 emergency exists at the southern border of the United States” from the unprecedented
6 “illegal entry of aliens” into the country. Proclamation 10,886, *Declaring a National*
7 *Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States*, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327, 8327 (Jan. 20,
8 2025). “Many of these aliens unlawfully within the United States present significant
9 threats to national security and public safety, committing vile and heinous acts against
10 innocent Americans.” Executive Order 14,159, *Protecting the American People Against*
11 *Invasion*, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443, 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025). Further exacerbating this national
12 crisis, some of these aliens find safe havens from federal law enforcement detection in so-
13 called Sanctuary Cities where they live and work among innocent Americans, who may
14 later become their crime victims.
- 15 2. This national crisis underscores the vital importance of “[e]nforcing our Nation’s
16 immigration laws.” *Id.* This action seeks to put an end to one State’s efforts to impede
17 the Federal Government from doing that.
- 18 3. The United States brings this declaratory and injunctive action to prohibit the State of
19 Illinois and its subdivisions from enforcing several state and local laws—namely, the Way
20 Forward Act, TRUST Act, Welcoming City Act, and Cook County, Ill. Ordinance 11-O-
21 73—that are designed to and in fact interfere with and discriminate against the Federal
22 Government’s enforcement of federal immigration law in violation of the Supremacy
23 Clause of the United States Constitution. *See* The TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et*
24
25
26
27
28

1 *seq.* (2017), *amended*, Illinois Way Forward Act, 2021 Ill. Legis. Serv. 102-234; Cook
2 County, Illinois Ordinance 11-O-73 (2011); and Welcoming City Ordinance, Chicago
3 Mun. Code ch. 2-173 (2012).

4 4. The United States has well-established, preeminent, and preemptive authority to regulate
5 immigration matters. This authority derives from the United States Constitution,
6 numerous acts of Congress, and binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, Congress
7 last week strengthened that authority with the enactment of the Laken Riley Act, S. 5,
8 119th Cong. (2025), which “mandates the federal detention of illegal immigrants who are
9 accused of theft, burglary, assaulting a law enforcement officer, and any crime that causes
10 death or serious bodily injury.” DHS, Press Release, President Trump Signs the Laken
11 Riley Act in Law, [https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/01/29/president-trump-signs-laken-](https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/01/29/president-trump-signs-laken-riley-act-law)
12 [riley-act-law](https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/01/29/president-trump-signs-laken-riley-act-law).
13
14

15 5. Both the Governor of Illinois JB Pritzker and Mayor of Chicago Brandon Johnson, sued
16 here in their official capacities, profess a shared interest with the Federal Government in
17 enforcing immigration laws to effectuate the removal of such offenders from the United
18 States. Last week on CNN, Governor Pritzker proclaimed: “Well let me start by being
19 clear that when we’re talking about violent criminals who’ve been convicted and who are
20 undocumented, we don’t want them in our state. We want them out of the country. We
21 hope they do get deported. And if that’s who they’re picking up, we’re all for it.”
22 [https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/26/politics/video/sotu-pritzker-on-planned-chicago-](https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/26/politics/video/sotu-pritzker-on-planned-chicago-immigration-raids)
23 [immigration-raids](https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/26/politics/video/sotu-pritzker-on-planned-chicago-immigration-raids). Illinois laws, however, provide otherwise.
24
25

26 6. The challenged provisions of Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County law reflect their
27 intentional effort to obstruct the Federal Government’s enforcement of federal
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1 immigration law and to impede consultation and communication between federal, state,
2 and local law enforcement officials that is necessary for federal officials to carry out
3 federal immigration law and keep Americans safe.

4 7. Upon information and belief, the conduct of officials in Chicago and Illinois minimally
5 enforcing—and oftentimes affirmatively thwarting—federal immigration laws over a
6 period of years has resulted in countless criminals being released into Chicago who should
7 have been held for immigration removal from the United States. According to the U.S.
8 Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Law Enforcement Statistical Tracking
9 Unit, from Fiscal Year 2016 until 2025, Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)
10 arrested 13,564 aliens in Illinois, lodging 11,036 detainees. For those arrested, many were
11 charged with serious crimes including assault, larceny, and sexual and drug-related
12 offenses.
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15 8. The Illinois Way Forward Act and TRUST Act both impede the Federal Government’s
16 ability to regulate immigration and take enforcement actions against illegal aliens by
17 preventing state law enforcement officials from assisting with federal civil immigration
18 enforcement. Under these laws, state officers are explicitly prohibited from complying
19 with immigration detainees or civil immigration warrants; they are also prevented from
20 entering into agreements to detain noncitizens for federal civil immigration violations.
21
22 *See* 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/15.
23

24 9. The Chicago law, the Welcoming City Ordinance, Chicago Municipal Code ch. 2-173,
25 limits the ability of Chicago law enforcement officers (1) to provide the Federal
26 Government with basic information about noncitizens who are in their custody and are
27 subject to federal immigration custody, including custody status or release date, and (2)
28

1 to provide federal officers access to such individuals to effect their safe transfer to federal
2 immigration custody when presented with a federal administrative warrant.

3 10. The Cook County law, Ordinance 11-O-73, "Policy for Responding to ICE Detainers,"
4 similarly limits the ability of Cook County law enforcement officers to provide the Federal
5 Government with basic information about noncitizens who are in their custody and are
6 subject to federal immigration custody, or to provide federal officers access to such
7 noncitizens to effect their safe transfer to federal immigration custody when presented
8 with a federal administrative warrant.
9

10 11. The challenged provisions of Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County law have the purpose
11 and effect of making it more difficult for, and deliberately impeding, federal immigration
12 officers' ability to carry out their responsibilities in those jurisdictions. These provisions
13 intentionally obstruct the sharing of information envisioned by Congress, including basic
14 information such as release dates and custodial status, thereby impairing federal detention
15 of removable aliens, including dangerous criminals, as required by federal law; they
16 further purport to direct federal officials to procure criminal arrest warrants in order to
17 take custody of removable aliens, even though Congress has made an explicit policy
18 choice that such removals can be effectuated by *civil* arrest warrants for immigration
19 enforcement; and they facilitate the release of dangerous criminals into the community by
20 directing local employees to refuse to transfer such aliens to federal officials in a secure
21 environment—thereby resulting in their release onto the streets, where they all too often
22 reoffend and commit serious crimes.
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- 1 12. Upon information and belief, the provisions of Chicago and Cook County law that restrict
2 information sharing jeopardize the safety of residents. For example, last August, federal
3 officials issued a detainer request for an alien being held in Cook County jail on domestic
4 violence charges. The detainer was not honored, and the alien was subsequently arrested
5 on October 10, 2024 for aggravated criminal sexual assault and abuse of a minor.
6
- 7 13. The Supremacy Clause prohibits Illinois, Chicago, Cook County, and their officials from
8 obstructing the Federal Government's ability to enforce laws that Congress has enacted
9 or to take actions entrusted to it by the Constitution.
10
- 11 14. The Supremacy Clause also prohibits Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County from singling
12 out the Federal Government for adverse treatment—as the challenged laws do—thereby
13 discriminating against the Federal Government. Accordingly, the provisions challenged
14 here are invalid and should be enjoined.

15 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

- 16 15. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345.
17
- 18 16. Venue is proper in this jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants City
19 of Chicago, Cook County, and their officials reside within the Northern District of Illinois
20 and because all Defendants' acts or omissions giving rise to this Complaint arose from
21 events occurring within this judicial district.
22
- 23 17. The Court has the authority to provide the relief requested under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201,
24 and 2202, and its inherent equitable powers.

25 **PARTIES**

- 26 18. Plaintiff, the United States of America, regulates immigration under its constitutional and
27 statutory authorities, and it enforces federal immigration laws through its Executive
28

1 agencies, including the Departments of Justice, State, Labor, and Homeland Security
2 (DHS) as well as DHS's component agencies U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
3 (ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

4 19. Defendant State of Illinois is a state of the Union.

5 20. Defendant JB Pritzker is the Governor of Illinois, and is being sued in his official
6 capacity.

7 21. Defendant City of Chicago is a city in the State of Illinois and a Sanctuary City.

8 22. Defendant Brandon Johnson is the Mayor of Chicago, and is being sued in his official
9 capacity.

10 23. Defendant Larry Snelling is the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, and
11 is being sued in his official capacity.

12 24. Defendant Cook County is a county in the State of Illinois.

13 25. Defendant Cook County Board of Commissioners is the governing board and legislative
14 body of Cook County, and is responsible for the management of the affairs of Cook
15 County.

16 26. Defendant Toni Preckwinkle is President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners,
17 and is being sued in her official capacity.

18 27. Defendant Thomas J. Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County, and is being sued in his official
19 capacity.

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24 **FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW**

25 28. The Constitution affords Congress the power to "establish a uniform Rule of
26 Naturalization," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and to "regulate Commerce with foreign
27 Nations," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and affords the President of the United States the
28

1 authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.

2 29. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution mandates that “[t]his Constitution, and the
3 Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
4 supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
5 Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, a state enactment is invalid if
6 it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
7 objectives of Congress,” *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), or if it
8 “discriminate[s] against the United States or those with whom it deals,” *South Carolina*
9 *v. Baker*, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988).

10
11 30. Based on its enumerated constitutional and sovereign powers to control and conduct
12 relations with foreign nations, the Federal Government has broad authority to establish
13 immigration laws, the execution of which States cannot obstruct or take discriminatory
14 actions against. *See Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012); *accord North*
15 *Dakota v. United States*, 495 U.S. 423, 435 (1990) (plurality); *id.* at 444–47 (Scalia, J.,
16 concurring).

17
18 31. Congress has exercised its authority to make laws governing the entry, presence, status,
19 and removal of aliens within the United States by enacting various provisions of the
20 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.*

21
22 32. These laws confer upon the Executive Branch extensive authority to inspect, investigate,
23 arrest, detain, and remove aliens who are suspected of being, or found to be, unlawfully
24 in the United States. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1231.

25
26 33. In effectuating these provisions, DHS may issue an “immigration detainer” that “serves
27 to advise another law enforcement agency that [DHS] seeks custody of an alien presently
28

1 in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien.” 8
2 C.F.R. § 287.7(a); *see* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(3), 1226(a), (c), 1231(a), 1357(d). An
3 immigration “detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release
4 of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody[.]” 8 C.F.R. §
5 287.7(a).
6

7 34. DHS also may request, but not require, that custody be extended by a period not to exceed
8 48 hours, “in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.” *Id.* § 287.7(d).
9 And in some instances, DHS is statutorily required – upon request from local authorities
10 – to consider whether to issue a detainer for an alien in local custody. *See* 8 U.S.C. §
11 1357(d) (addressing violations of laws regulating controlled substances). In other cases,
12 DHS is required to issue a detainer for certain aliens, including any alien who is “charged
13 with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts
14 which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or
15 assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious
16 bodily injury to another person[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
17
18

19 35. On January 29, 2025, President Trump signed into law the Laken Riley Act, named for
20 the nursing student killed by an alien who, after entering the United States illegally,
21 committed additional crimes but was released before immigration authorities could
22 intervene. *See* Laken Riley Act, S. 5, 119th Cong. (2025). The Laken Riley Act requires
23 DHS to detain aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States and have been
24 arrested for theft and other crimes. *Id.*
25

26 36. Congress has also codified basic principles of cooperation and comity between state and
27 local authorities and the Federal Government. For example, federal law contemplates that
28

1 removable aliens in state custody who have been convicted of state or local offenses will
2 generally serve their state or local criminal sentences before being subject to removal but
3 will be taken into federal custody upon the expiration of their state prison terms. *See* 8
4 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(4).

5
6 37. “Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the
7 immigration system.” *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 411. Congress has therefore directed that a
8 federal, state, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way
9 restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, DHS
10 “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
11 individual.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a); *see id.* § 1644 (same); *see also id.* § 1357(g)(10)(A)
12 (providing for state and local “communicat[ion] with [DHS] regarding the immigration
13 status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not
14 lawfully present in the United States”). Likewise, “no person or agency may prohibit, or
15 in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from,” among other things,
16 “[m]aintaining” “information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
17 individual,” or “[e]xchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local
18 government entity.” *Id.* § 1373(b).

19
20
21 38. Congress also authorized states and localities “to cooperate with the [Secretary of DHS]
22 in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in
23 the United States.” *Id.* § 1357(g)(10)(B).

24
25 39. Congress further sought to affirmatively penalize efforts to obstruct immigration
26 enforcement by, among other things, prohibiting the “conceal[ing], harbor[ing], or
27 shield[ing] from detection, or attempts to” accomplish the same, of any “alien in any place,
28

1 including any building or any means of transportation.” *Id.* § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).

- 2 40. DHS, through ICE and CBP, performs a significant portion of its law enforcement
3 activities in Chicago and Cook County. For example, since Fiscal Year 2024, ERO has
4 issued 1,470 detainers in Illinois, and made 400 at-large arrests in Illinois, with 329, or
5 roughly 82%, occurring in the Chicago area. And CBP is responsible for enforcing the
6 immigration laws at international ports of entry, including apprehending attempted
7 entrants with criminal convictions or who are national security concerns.
8

9 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

10 **Illinois’s TRUST Act and Way Forward Act**

- 11 41. The Illinois TRUST Act was enacted in 2017 to prohibit state law enforcement officials
12 from participating in federal civil immigration enforcement. *See* TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp.
13 Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017). The TRUST Act was amended in 2021 by the Way Forward
14 Act, to, among other things, prevent state and local law enforcement officials from
15 entering into agreements to detain individuals for federal civil immigration violations. *See*
16 *id.* at 805/15(g).
17

- 18 42. The Way Forward Act along with the TRUST Act limit cooperation with federal
19 enforcement in numerous ways. For example, Section 15 of the TRUST Act prohibits “[a]
20 law enforcement agency or law enforcement official” from “detain[ing] or continu[ing] to
21 detain any individual solely on the basis of any immigration detainer or civil immigration
22 warrant or otherwise comply with an immigration detainer or civil immigration warrant.”
23 *Id.* at 805/15(a).
24

- 25 43. Under that section, unless presented with a federal criminal warrant, or otherwise required
26 by federal law, state law enforcement officials may not “assist in any capacity with an
27
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1 immigration agent's enforcement operations," *id.* at 805/15(h). The prohibition extends
2 to offering collateral assistance, including coordinating an arrest in a public facility; giving
3 an immigration agent access, even by telephone, to an alien in state custody; transferring
4 an alien to an immigration agent's custody; providing information in response to an
5 immigration agent's inquiry or request; and providing information to an immigration
6 agent regarding an alien's release date or contact information that is not otherwise publicly
7 available. *See id.* at 805/15(h).

9 44. In addition, "[a state] law enforcement agency or law enforcement official may not inquire
10 about or investigate the citizenship or immigration status or place of birth of any individual
11 in the agency or official's custody or who has otherwise been stopped or detained by the
12 agency or official." *Id.* at 805/15(e).

14 45. The TRUST Act purportedly does not prohibit "sending to, or receiving from, the United
15 States Department of Homeland Security or other federal, State, or local government
16 entity information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual under
17 Sections 1373 and 1644 of Title 8 of the United States Code," or "contacting another law
18 enforcement agency for the purposes of clarifying or confirming the civil or criminal
19 nature of notifications or other records" in certain databases. *Id.* at 805/5. And the Act
20 permits "a [state] law enforcement agency or law enforcement official to request evidence
21 of citizenship or immigration status pursuant to the Firearm Owners Identification Card
22 Act, the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, Article 24 of the Criminal Code of 2012, or 18
23 United States Code Sections 921 through 931." *Id.* at 805/15(e).

26 46. Finally, the TRUST Act does not preclude a state law enforcement official from
27 cooperating with other federal agencies, including Homeland Security Investigations
28

(HSI), in investigating criminal violations “in order to ensure public safety.” *See id.* at 805/15(i).

Chicago’s Restrictions on State and Local Cooperation with Federal Officials
(Chicago Municipal Code ch. 2-173)

47. In 2012, the Chicago City Council passed the “Welcoming City Ordinance,” Chicago Code ch. 2-173, which sought to “clarify the communications and enforcement relationship between the City and the federal government,” in addition to “establish[ing] the City’s procedures concerning immigration status and enforcement of federal civil immigration laws.” Chicago Mun. Code § 2-173-005.

48. The Ordinance explicitly and intentionally limits local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement in various ways. It provides that no city agent or agency shall “detain, or continue to detain a person based upon an immigration detainer” or “an administrative warrant, including, but not limited to, those entered into the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center database, or successor or similar database maintained by the United States.” *Id.* § 2-173-020(a)(1). Moreover, no city agent shall permit ICE agents “access, including by telephone, to a person being detained by, or in the custody of, the [city] agency or agent,” or “use of [city] agency facilities for investigative interviews or other investigative purpose.” *Id.* § 2-173-020(a)(2). Nor shall city agents “expend their time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding a person’s custody status, release date, or contact information.” *Id.* § 2-173-020(a)(3).

49. Section 2-173-030 provides that: “Unless required to do so by statute, federal regulation, court order, or a lawfully issued judicial warrant, no [city] agent or agency shall request, maintain, or share the citizenship or immigration status of any person unless such

disclosure has been authorized in writing by the individual to whom such information pertains, or if such individual is a minor or is otherwise not legally competent, by such individual's parent or guardian." *Id.* § 2-17-030(a)(1).

50. These provisions used to contain a limited exception when the subject of the investigation: (1) had an outstanding criminal warrant, (2) had been convicted of a felony, (3) was a defendant in a criminal case with a pending felony charge, or (4) was a known gang member, but those exceptions were repealed in 2021. *See id.* 2-173-042(c) (repealed).

51. Upon information and belief, Chicago law enforcement officials have been chilled by these prohibitions.

52. Upon information and belief, Chicago law enforcement officials are also confused by the restrictions on them and thus do not provide even the permissible cooperation out of fear of punishment.

Cook County's Restrictions on State and Local Cooperation with Federal Officials
(Cook County Code § 46-37)

53. In 2011, the Cook County Board of Commissioners approved and adopted Ordinance 11-O-73, "Policy for Responding to ICE Detainers," which added Section 46-37 to the Cook County Code. The policy purports to establish the "proper boundaries of the relationship between local law enforcement and" ICE. Ordinance 11-O-73, pmbl.

54. The Cook County Ordinance limits local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement in numerous ways. It mandates that the county Sheriff "shall decline all ICE detainer requests unless there is a written agreement with the federal government by which all costs incurred by Cook County in responding to the detainer shall be reimbursed" and that "there shall be no expenditure of any County resources or effort by on-duty County personnel for [the] purpose" of cooperating with ICE detainers. Cook County Code, § 46-

1 37(a), (c). Section 46-37(b) of the County Code provides that “ICE agents shall not be
2 given access to individuals . . . , and County personnel shall not expend their time
3 responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding individuals’
4 incarceration status or release dates while on duty.”

5 55. These provisions contain limited exceptions. County personnel may only provide ICE
6 access to individuals in County custody or share information concerning an individual’s
7 incarceration status or release date if “ICE agents have a criminal warrant, or County
8 officials have a legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement
9 of immigration laws.” *Id.* § 46-37(b).
10

11 56. The Federal Government, through ICE, has offered to reimburse certain costs incurred by
12 Cook County as a result of honoring ICE detainees. Cook County rejected that offer.
13

14 57. Upon information and belief, since April 1, 2024, there have been numerous instances
15 where Cook County law enforcement officers failed to honor a federal immigration
16 detainer request concerning an alien who was subsequently criminally charged following
17 the alien’s release from jail. Had the requested information sharing occurred in these
18 instances, the commission of numerous crimes likely would have been averted.
19

20 58. Consequently, not only are Cook County employees effectively barred from requesting
21 and sharing information regarding immigration status with ICE or other law enforcement
22 agencies, but where ICE has issued an immigration detainer for an alien in local custody,
23 the detainer is removed from the alien’s permanent criminal file, and therefore does not
24 follow the alien if he/she is transferred to long-term state incarceration.
25

26 59. Upon information and belief, Cook County does not impose these restrictions on other
27 forms of information sharing or other law enforcement agencies. *See* Cook County
28

Ordinance 11-O-73.

60. Upon information and belief, Cook County law enforcement officials have been chilled by these prohibitions.

61. Upon information and belief, Cook County law enforcement officials are also confused by the county restrictions on them and thus do not provide even the permissible cooperation out of fear of punishment.

THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS' IMPACT ON FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT

62. The combined effect of the challenged provisions of Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County laws, Ill. SB0667, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805, Chicago Mun. Code §§ 2-173-020, 2-173-030 and Cook County Code § 46-37, facially and as applied, prohibits even the most basic cooperation with federal officials. Congress, in comity to States, permitted state and local jurisdictions to fully punish aliens for state criminal violations prior to removal. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(A) (providing that, subject to limited exceptions, federal agents “may not remove an alien who is sentenced to imprisonment until the alien is released from imprisonment”). But Congress crafted a statutory scheme that clearly envisioned the Federal Government being able to detain and remove those aliens, once their state proceedings and sentences concluded.

63. Specifically, Congress specified that the removal period begins immediately upon release from state criminal custody, *id.* § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii), and detention during that period is mandatory, *id.* § 1231(a)(2); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(3), *id.* § 1357(d) (directing immigration officers to obtain a detainer to facilitate the transfer of criminal aliens from state to federal custody). Congress granted this permission expecting that States would

1 then facilitate, or at the very least not obstruct, detention of criminal aliens by federal
2 immigration authorities. If ICE lacks knowledge of criminal aliens' release dates from
3 state custody, ICE cannot exercise its statutory responsibility of effecting an arrest upon
4 the alien's release.

5
6 64. Furthermore, federal law contemplates that DHS will be able to inspect all applicants for
7 admission, and take all appropriate action against those found to be inadmissible to the
8 United States, even those transferred to state or local custody pending prosecution. *See id.*
9 §§ 1182, 1225(b)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 235.2. And, to facilitate coordination between state and
10 local officials and the Federal Government, Congress expressly prohibited any federal,
11 state, or local government entity or official from prohibiting, or in any way restricting,
12 any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, DHS "information
13 regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual," 8
14 U.S.C. § 1373(a), or from maintaining and exchanging such information with other law
15 enforcement entities. *Id.* § 1373(b); *see also id.* § 1644.

16
17
18 65. The challenged Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County laws directly conflict with this
19 scheme.

20 66. The Welcoming City Ordinance runs directly afoul of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 by forbidding city
21 officers from "expend[ing] their time responding to ICE inquiries . . . regarding a person's
22 custody status, release date, or contact information," Chicago Mun. Code § 2-173-
23 020(a)(3), and further providing that such officers may not "request, maintain, or share
24 the citizenship or immigration status of any person," *id.* § 2-173-030(a)(1). Nor can
25 Chicago point to its purported savings clause to avoid that reality. The savings clause
26 allows agents to undertake those activities "if required to do so by statute, federal
27
28

1 regulation, court order, or a lawfully issued judicial warrant,” *id.* § 2-173-030(a), but
2 rather than require States and local governments to share and maintain that information,
3 federal law only prohibits restrictions on those activities. Chicago has therefore prohibited
4 the activities that federal law expressly contemplates States will do.

5
6 67. Moreover, Chicago’s failure to provide exceptions to its prohibition on cooperation with
7 federal immigration agents conflicts with federal law governing what constitutes a
8 predicate for inadmissibility or removability. *See id.* §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2). Federal
9 agents are required to detain illegal aliens who have committed certain offenses upon their
10 release from state custody. Congress not only recently reaffirmed its commitment to this
11 mandate, but augmented the authority of federal agents in this space by adding predicate
12 offenses that trigger this detention requirement, *id.* §§ 1226(c), (c)(3), 1357(d); *see also*
13 Laken Riley Act, S. 5, 119th Cong. (2025).

14
15 68. The restrictions on providing ICE access to removable aliens in their custody, *see* 5 Ill.
16 Comp. Stat. 805/15(a), (h); Cook County Code § 46-37(b); Chicago Mun. Code § 2-173-
17 020, also conflict with federal law, which establishes a system of civil administrative
18 warrants as the basis for immigration arrest and removal, and does not require or
19 contemplate use of a judicial warrant for civil immigration enforcement. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§
20 1226(a), 1231(a).

21
22 69. Further, upon information and belief, because of the challenged laws, DHS lacks the
23 ability to readily obtain from local law enforcement the release date of aliens whom DHS
24 has reason to believe are removable from the United States, and DHS lacks access to such
25 aliens to facilitate the transfer of custody, even where DHS presents a Congressionally
26 authorized civil administrative warrant of arrest or removal, *see id.* §§ 1226(a), 1231(a),
27
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1 or has transferred those aliens to local law enforcement in the first instance to permit their
2 prosecution for a state crime.

3 70. By restricting basic information sharing and barring DHS access to aliens in state or local
4 custody upon their release as provided by federal law (e.g., an administrative warrant), the
5 challenged Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County laws require federal immigration officers
6 either (1) to engage in difficult and dangerous efforts to re-arrest aliens who were
7 previously in local custody, endangering immigration officers, the particular alien, and
8 others who may be nearby, or (2) to determine that it is not appropriate to transfer an alien
9 to local custody in the first place, in order to comply with their mission to enforce the
10 immigration laws.
11

12
13 71. Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County have no lawful interest in assisting removable aliens'
14 evasion of federal law enforcement.

15 72. Upon information and belief, neither Illinois, nor Chicago, nor Cook County permits its
16 employees to place a detainer or administrative warrant in the alien's file or to enter its
17 existence in government databases, such that if an alien is transferred to another law
18 enforcement agency, that agency cannot act on the undisclosed detainer or administrative
19 warrant or learn about and share that alien's immigration status with other law
20 enforcement, including the Federal Government.
21

22 73. Illinois, Chicago, and Cook County single out the Federal Government for their disfavored
23 treatment. *See* 5 Ill. Comp. Stat 805/15; Chicago Mun. Code § 2-173-020; Cook County
24 Ordinance 11-O-73.
25

26 74. These provisions are an obstacle to the Federal Government's enforcement of the
27 immigration laws and discriminate against federal immigration enforcement, as well as
28

(with respect to the information-sharing and maintenance restrictions) expressly violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373.

75. In rejecting congressionally authorized means of enforcing federal immigration law, including detainers and administrative warrants, these provisions constitute unlawful direct regulation of the Federal Government.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

**COUNT ONE – VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
(PREEMPTION)**

76. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 75 of the Complaint as if fully stated herein.

77. The challenged provisions of the TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance ch. 2-173 constitute and create obstacles to the enforcement of federal immigration law.

78. The challenged provisions of those acts also undermine federal immigration law's protections for information sharing and are thus preempted under both express and conflict preemption principles. *E.g.*, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373(a), 1644.

79. Federal immigration law therefore preempts the challenged provisions of the TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance ch. 2-173.

80. Accordingly, those provisions violate the Supremacy Clause, interfere with federal law, and create obstacles to the enforcement of federal immigration law both on their face and as applied to the Federal Government.

COUNT TWO – VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
(UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT)

81. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 80 of the Complaint as if fully stated herein.

82. Defendants' enforcement of the challenged provisions of the TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance ch. 2-173 discriminates against the Federal Government.

83. The challenged provisions single out federal immigration officials, expressly and implicitly, for unfavorable and uncooperative treatment when other law enforcement officials are not so treated.

84. Accordingly, the challenged provisions of the TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance ch. 2-173 violate the Doctrine of Intergovernmental Immunity and therefore alternatively are invalid on that basis.

COUNT THREE – VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
(UNLAWFUL REGULATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT)

85. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 84 of the Complaint as if fully stated herein.

86. Defendants' enforcement of the challenged provisions of the TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance ch. 2-173 effects direct regulation of the Federal Government.

1 87. By refusing to honor civil detainers and warrants expressly authorized by Congress,
2 Defendants have unlawfully eliminated these means for federal immigrations officials to
3 carry out their statutory functions.

4 88. Accordingly, the challenged provisions of the TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.*
5 (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667 (2021); Cook County Ordinance
6 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance ch. 2-173 effect
7 regulation of the Federal Government and alternatively are invalid on that basis.
8

9 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

10 WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests the following relief:
11

- 12 1. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that the challenged provisions of the TRUST
13 Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667
14 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City
15 Ordinance ch. 2-173 violate the Supremacy Clause and are therefore invalid;
16
- 17 2. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that the challenged provisions of the TRUST
18 Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way Forward Act, SB0667
19 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and Chicago Welcoming City
20 Ordinance ch. 2-173 violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and are therefore invalid;
21
- 22 3. That this Court issue preliminary and permanent injunctions that prohibit Defendants as
23 well as their successors, agents, and employees, from enforcing the challenged provisions
24 of the TRUST Act, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 805/1 *et seq.* (2017), as amended by the Way
25 Forward Act, SB0667 (2021); Cook County Ordinance 11-O-73, § 46-37 (2011); and
26 Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance ch. 2-173;
27
- 28 4. That this Court award the United States its costs and fees in this action; and

1 5. That this Court award any other relief it deems just and proper.

2 DATED: February 6, 2025

3
4 BRETT A. SHUMATE
5 Acting Assistant Attorney General
6 Civil Division

7 DREW C. ENSIGN
8 Deputy Assistant Attorney General
9 AUGUST FLENTJE
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25
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27
28

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 5, 1957

James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

U. S. Naval Base
Newport, Rhode Island

THE PRESIDENT TODAY SENT THE
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO THE
HONORABLE ORVAL E. FAUBUS,
THE GOVERNOR OF ARKANSAS

The Honorable Orval E. Faubus
Governor of Arkansas
Little Rock, Arkansas

Your telegram received requesting my assurance of understanding of and cooperation in the course of action you have taken on school integration recommended by the Little Rock School Board and ordered by the United States District Court pursuant to the mandate of the United States Supreme Court.

When I became President, I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. The only assurance I can give you is that the Federal Constitution will be upheld by me by every legal means at my command.

There is no basis of fact to the statements you make in your telegram that Federal authorities have been considering taking you into custody or that telephone lines to your Executive Mansion have been tapped by any agency of the Federal Government.

At the request of Judge Davies, the Department of Justice is presently collecting facts as to interference with or failure to comply with the District Court's order. You and other state officials -- as well as the National Guard which, of course, is uniformed, armed and partially sustained by the Government -- will, I am sure, give full cooperation to the United States District Court.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

#####

Daniel Webster

SECOND REPLY TO HAYNE ¹

January 26 and 27, 1830

(In the Senate)

Mr. President, when the mariner has been tossed for many days in thick weather, and on an unknown sea, he naturally avails himself of the first pause in the storm, the earliest glance of the sun, to take his latitude, and ascertain how far the elements have driven him from his true course. Let us imitate this prudence, and, before we float farther on the waves of this debate, refer to the point from which we departed, that we may at least be able to conjecture where we now are. I ask for the reading of the resolution before the Senate.

The secretary read the resolution, as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee on Public Lands be instructed to inquire and report the quantity of public lands remaining unsold within each State and Territory, and whether it be expedient to limit for a certain period the sales of the public lands to such lands only as have heretofore been offered for sale, and are now subject to entry at the minimum price. And, also, whether the office of Surveyor-General, and some of the land offices, may not be abolished without detriment to the public interest; or whether it be expedient to adopt measures to hasten the sales and extend more rapidly the surveys of the public lands.

We have thus heard, sir, what the resolution is which is actually before us for consideration; and it will readily occur to every one, that it is almost the only subject about which something has not been said in the speech, running through two days, by which the Senate has been entertained by the gentleman from South Carolina. Every topic in the wide range of our public affairs, whether past or present—everything, general or local, whether belonging to national politics or party politics—seems to have attracted more or less of the honorable

member's attention, save only the resolution before the Senate. He has spoken of everything but the public lands; they have escaped his notice. To that subject, in all his excursions, he has not paid even the cold respect of a passing glance.

"THAT SHOT . . . HAS NOW BEEN RECEIVED"

When this debate, sir, was to be resumed on Thursday morning, it so happened that it would have been convenient for me to be elsewhere. The honorable member, however, did not incline to put off the discussion to another day. He had a shot, he said, to return, and he wished to discharge it. That shot, sir, which he thus kindly informed us was coming, that we might stand out of the way, or prepare ourselves to fall by it and die with decency, has now been received. Under all advantages, and with expectation awakened by the tone which preceded it, it has been discharged, and has spent its force. It may become me to say no more of its effect, than that, if nobody is found, after all, either killed or wounded, it is not the first time, in the history of human affairs, that the vigor and success of the war have not quite come up to the lofty and sounding phrase of the manifesto.

The gentleman, sir, in declining to postpone the debate, told the Senate, with the emphasis of his hand upon his heart, that there was something rankling *here*, which he wished to relieve. [Mr. Hayne rose, and disclaimed having used the word *rankling*.] It would not, Mr. President, be safe for the honorable member to appeal to those around him, upon the question whether he did in fact make use of that word. But he may have been unconscious of it. At any rate, it is enough that he disclaims it. But

¹ Edwin P. Whipple, ed., *The Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster* (Boston, 1880), pp. 227-69.

still, with or without the use of that particular word, he had yet something *here*, he said, of which he wished to rid himself by an immediate reply. In this respect, sir, I have a great advantage over the honorable gentleman. There is nothing *here*, sir, which gives me the slightest uneasiness; neither fear, nor anger, nor that which is sometimes more troublesome than either, the consciousness of having been in the wrong. There is nothing, either originating *here*, or now received *here* by the gentleman's shot. Nothing originating *here*, for I had not the slightest feeling of unkindness towards the honorable member. Some passages, it is true, had occurred since our acquaintance in this body, which I could have wished might have been otherwise; but I had used philosophy and forgotten them. I paid the honorable member the attention of listening with respect to his first speech; and when he sat down, though surprised, and I must even say astonished, at some of his opinions, nothing was farther from my intention than to commence any personal warfare. Through the whole of the few remarks I made in answer, I avoided, studiously and carefully, everything which I thought possible to be construed into disrespect. And, sir, while there is thus nothing originating *here* which I have wished at any time, or now wish, to discharge, I must repeat, also, that nothing has been received *here* which *rankles*, or in any way gives me annoyance. I will not accuse the honorable member of violating the rules of civilized war; I will not say, that he poisoned his arrows. But whether his shafts were, or were not, dipped in that which would have caused rankling if they had reached their destination, there was not, as it happened, quite strength enough in the bow to bring them to their mark. If he wishes now to gather up those shafts, he must look for them elsewhere; they will not be found fixed and quivering in the object at which they were aimed.

The honorable member complained that I had slept on his speech. I must have slept on it, or not slept at all. The moment the honorable member sat down, his friend from Missouri ²

² Thomas Hart Benton (1782-1858) served in the Senate, 1821-1851 (See Speeches No. 10 and 14).

rose, and, with much honeyed commendation of the speech, suggested that the impressions which it had produced were too charming and delightful to be disturbed by other sentiments or other sounds, and proposed that the Senate should adjourn. Would it have been quite amiable in me, sir, to interrupt this excellent good feeling? Must I not have been absolutely malicious, if I could have thrust myself forward, to destroy sensations thus pleasing? Was it not much better and kinder, both to sleep upon them myself, and to allow others also the pleasure of sleeping upon them? But if it be meant, by sleeping upon his speech, that I took time to prepare a reply to it, it is quite a mistake. Owing to other engagements, I could not employ even the interval between the adjournment of the Senate and its meeting the next morning, in attention to the subject of this debate. Nevertheless, sir, the mere matter of fact is undoubtedly true. I did sleep on the gentleman's speech, and slept soundly. And I slept equally well on his speech of yesterday, to which I am now replying. It is quite possible that in this respect, also, I possess some advantage over the honorable member, attributable, doubtless, to a cooler temperament on my part; for, in truth, I slept upon his speeches remarkably well.

"WHY WAS HE SINGLED OUT?"

But the gentleman inquires why *he* was made the object of such a reply. Why was *he* singled out? If an attack has been made on the East, he, he assures us, did not begin it; it was made by the gentleman from Missouri. Sir, I answered the gentleman's speech because I happened to hear it; and because, also, I chose to give an answer to that speech, which, if unanswered, I thought most likely to produce injurious impressions. I did not stop to inquire who was the original drawer of the bill. I found a responsible indorser before me, and it was my purpose to hold him liable, and to bring him to his just responsibility, without delay. But, sir, this interrogatory of the honorable member was only introductory to another. He proceeded to ask me whether I had turned upon him, in this debate, from the consciousness that I should find an

overmatch, if I ventured on a contest with his friend from Missouri. If, sir, the honorable member, *modestiae gratia*, had chosen thus to defer to his friend, and to pay him a compliment, without intentional disparagement to others, it would have been quite according to the friendly courtesies of debate, and not at all ungrateful to my own feelings. I am not one of those, sir, who esteem any tribute of regard, whether light and occasional, or more serious and deliberate, which may be bestowed on others, as so much unjustly withholden from themselves. But the tone and manner of the gentleman's question forbid me thus to interpret it. I am not at liberty to consider it as nothing more than a civility to his friend. It had an air of taunt and disparagement, something of the loftiness of asserted superiority, which does not allow me to pass it over without notice. It was put as a question for me to answer, and so put as if it were difficult for me to answer, whether I deemed the member from Missouri an overmatch for myself, in debate here. It seems to me, sir, that this is extraordinary language, and an extraordinary tone, for the discussions of this body.

"THIS IS A SENATE . . . OF EQUALS"

Matches and overmatches! Those terms are more applicable elsewhere than here, and fitter for other assemblies than this. Sir, the gentleman seems to forget where and what we are. This is a Senate, a Senate of equals, of men of individual honor and personal character, and of absolute independence. We know no masters, we acknowledge no dictators. This is a hall for mutual consultation and discussion; not an arena for the exhibition of champions. I offer myself, sir, as a match for no man; I throw the challenge of debate at no man's feet. But then, sir, since the honorable member has put the question in a manner that calls for an answer, I will give him an answer; and I tell him, that, holding myself to be the humblest of the members here, I yet know nothing in the arm of his friend from Missouri, either alone or when aided by the arm of *his* friend from South Carolina, that need deter even me from espousing

whatever opinions I may choose to espouse, from debating whenever I may choose to debate, or from speaking whatever I may see fit to say, on the floor of the Senate. Sir, when uttered as matter of commendation or compliment, I should dissent from nothing which the honorable member might say of his friend. Still less do I put forth any pretensions of my own. But when put to me as matter of taunt, I throw it back, and say to the gentleman, that he could possibly say nothing less likely than such a comparison to wound my pride of personal character. The anger of its tone rescued the remark from intentional irony, which otherwise, probably, would have been its general acceptance. But, sir, if it be imagined that by this mutual quotation and commendation; if it be supposed that, by casting the characters of the drama, assigning to each his part, to one the attack, to another the cry of onset; or if it be thought that, by a loud and empty vaunt of anticipated victory, any laurels are to be won here; if it be imagined, especially, that any, or all these things will shake any purpose of mine, I can tell the honorable member, once for all, that he is greatly mistaken, and that he is dealing with one of whose temper and character he has yet much to learn. Sir, I shall not allow myself, on this occasion, I hope on no occasion, to be betrayed into any loss of temper; but if provoked, as I trust I never shall be, into crimination and recrimination, the honorable member may perhaps find that, in that contest, there will be blows to take as well as blows to give; that others can state comparisons as significant, at least, as his own, and that his impunity may possibly demand of him whatever powers of taunt and sarcasm he may possess. I commend him to a prudent husbandry of his resources.

"THE GHOST OF THE MURDERED COALITION"

But, sir, the coalition! The coalition! Ay, "the murdered coalition!" The gentleman asks, if I were led or frightened into this debate by the spectre of the coalition. "Was it the ghost of the murdered coalition," he exclaims, "which haunted the member from Massachusetts; and which, like the ghost of Banquo, would never

down?" "The murdered coalition!" Sir, this charge of a coalition, in reference to the late administration, is not original with the honorable member. It did not spring up in the Senate. Whether as a fact, as an argument, or as an embellishment, it is all borrowed. He adopts it, indeed, from a very low origin, and a still lower present condition. It is one of the thousand calumnies with which the press teemed, during an excited political canvass. It was a charge, of which there was not only no proof or probability, but which was in itself wholly impossible to be true. No man of common information ever believed a syllable of it. Yet it was of that class of falsehoods, which, by continued repetition, through all the organs of detraction and abuse, are capable of misleading those who are already far misled, and of further fanning passion already kindling into flame. Doubtless it served in its day, and in greater or less degree, the end designed by it. Having done that, it has sunk into the general mass of stale and loathed calumnies. It is the very cast-off slough of a polluted and shameless press. Incapable of further mischief, it lies in the sewer, lifeless and despised. It is not now, sir, in the power of the honorable member to give it dignity or decency, by attempting to elevate it, and to introduce it into the Senate. He cannot change it from what it is, an object of general disgust and scorn. On the contrary, the contact, if he choose to touch it, is more likely to drag him down, down, to the place where it lies itself.

But, sir, the honorable member was not, for other reasons, entirely happy in his allusion to the story of Banquo's murder and Banquo's ghost. It was not, I think, the friends, but the enemies of the murdered Banquo, at whose bidding his spirit would not *down*. The honorable gentleman is fresh in his reading of the English classics, and can put me right if I am wrong; but according to my poor recollection, it was at those who had begun with caresses and ended with foul and treacherous murder that the gory locks were shaken. The ghost of Banquo, like that of Hamlet, was an honest ghost. It disturbed no innocent man. It knew where its appearance would strike terror, and who would cry out, A ghost! It made itself visible in the right quarter, and compelled the guilty and the

conscience-smitten, and none others, to start, with,

Pr'ythee, see there! behold!—look! lo
If I stand here, I saw him!

Their eyeballs were seared (was it not so, sir?) who had thought to shield themselves by concealing their own hand, and laying the imputation of the crime on a low and hireling agency in wickedness; who had vainly attempted to stifle the workings of their own coward consciences by ejaculating through white lips and chattering teeth, "Thou canst not say I did it!" I have misread the great poet if those who had no way partaken in the deed of the death, either found that they were, or *feared that they should be*, pushed from their stools by the ghost of the slain, or exclaimed to a spectre created by their own fears and their own remorse, "Avaunt! and quit our sight!"

There is another particular, sir, in which the honorable member's quick perception of resemblances might, I should think, have seen something in the story of Banquo, making it not altogether a subject of the most pleasant contemplation. Those who murdered Banquo, what did they win by it? Substantial good? Permanent power? Or disappointment, rather, and sore mortification; dust and ashes, the common fate of vaulting ambition overleaping itself? Did not even-handed justice ere long commend the poisoned chalice to their own lips? Did they not soon find that for another they had "filed their mind"? that their ambition, though apparently for the moment successful, had but put a barren sceptre in their grasp? Ay, sir,

a barren sceptre in their gripe,
Thence to be wrenched with an unlineal hand,
No son of theirs succeeding.

Sir, I need pursue the allusion no farther. I leave the honorable gentleman to run it out at his leisure, and to derive from it all the gratification it is calculated to administer. If he finds himself pleased with the associations, and prepared to be quite satisfied, though the parallel should be entirely completed, I had almost said, I am satisfied also; but that I shall think of. Yes, sir, I will think of that.

"MR. DANE LIVES A LITTLE TOO FAR NORTH"

In the course of my observations the other day, Mr. President, I paid a passing tribute of respect to a very worthy man, Mr. Dane of Massachusetts.³ It so happened that he drew the Ordinance of 1787, for the government of the Northwestern Territory. A man of so much ability, and so little pretence; of so great a capacity to do good, and so unmixed a disposition to do it for its own sake; a gentleman who had acted an important part, forty years ago, in a measure the influence of which is still deeply felt in the very matter which was the subject of debate, might, I thought, receive from me a commendatory recognition. But the honorable member was inclined to be facetious on the subject. He was rather disposed to make it matter of ridicule, that I had introduced into the debate the name of one Nathan Dane, of whom he assures us he had never before heard. Sir, if the honorable member had never before heard of Mr. Dane, I am sorry for it. It shows him less acquainted with the public men of the country than I had supposed. Let me tell him, however, that a sneer from him at the mention of the name of Mr. Dane is in bad taste. It may well be a high mark of ambition, sir, either with the honorable gentleman or myself, to accomplish as much to make our names known to advantage, and remembered with gratitude, as Mr. Dane has accomplished. But the truth is, sir, I suspect, that Mr. Dane lives a little too far north. He is of Massachusetts, and too near the north star to be reached by the honorable gentleman's telescope. If his sphere had happened to range south of Mason and Dixon's line, he might, probably, have come within the scope of his vision.

I spoke, sir, of the Ordinance of 1787, which prohibits slavery, in all future times, northwest of the Ohio, as a measure of great wisdom and foresight, and one which had been attended with highly beneficial and permanent consequences. I supposed that, on this point, no two gentlemen in the Senate could entertain different opinions. But the simple expression of this

sentiment has led the gentleman, not only into a labored defence of slavery, in the abstract, and on principle, but also into a warm accusation against me, as having attacked the system of domestic slavery now existing in the southern states. For all this, there was not the slightest foundation, in anything said or intimated by me. I did not utter a single word which any ingenuity could torture into an attack on the slavery of the South. I said, only, that it was highly wise and useful, in legislating for the northwestern country while it was yet a wilderness, to prohibit the introduction of slaves; and I added, that I presumed there was no reflecting and intelligent person, in the neighboring state of Kentucky, who would doubt that, if the same prohibition had been extended, at the same early period, over that commonwealth, her strength and population would, at this day, have been far greater than they are. If these opinions be thought doubtful, they are nevertheless, I trust, neither extraordinary nor disrespectful. They attack nobody and menace nobody. And yet, sir, the gentleman's optics have discovered, even in the mere expression of this sentiment, what he calls the very spirit of the Missouri question! He represents me as making an onset on the whole South, and manifesting a spirit which would interfere with, and disturb, their domestic condition!

THERE IS NO DISPOSITION IN THE NORTH TO INTERFERE WITH
SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH

Sir, this injustice no otherwise surprises me, than as it is committed here, and committed without the slightest pretence of ground for it. I say it only surprises me as being done here; for I know full well, that it is, and has been, the settled policy of some persons in the South, for years, to represent the people of the North as disposed to interfere with them in their own exclusive and peculiar concerns. This is a delicate and sensitive point in southern feeling; and of late years it has always been touched, and generally with effect, whenever the object has been to unite the whole South against northern men or northern measures. This feeling, always carefully kept alive, and maintained at too intense a heat to admit discrimination or reflec-

³ Nathan Dane (1752-1835) was one of the two drafters of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. He served in the Continental Congress, 1785-1787.

tion, is a lever of great power in our political machine. It moves vast bodies, and gives to them one and the same direction. But it is without adequate cause, and the suspicion which exists is wholly groundless. There is not, and never has been, a disposition in the North to interfere with these interests of the South. Such interference has never been supposed to be within the power of government; nor has it been in any way attempted. The slavery of the South has always been regarded as a matter of domestic policy, left with the states themselves, and with which the federal government had nothing to do. Certainly, sir, I am, and ever have been, of that opinion. The gentleman, indeed, argues that slavery, in the abstract, is no evil. Most assuredly I need not say I differ with him, altogether and most widely, on that point. I regard domestic slavery as one of the greatest evils, both moral and political. But whether it be a malady, and whether it be curable, and if so, by what means; or, on the other hand, whether it be the *vulnus immedicabile* of the social system, I leave it to those whose right and duty it is to inquire and to decide. And this I believe, sir, is, and uniformly has been, the sentiment of the North. Let us look a little at the history of this matter.

When the present Constitution was submitted for the ratification of the people, there were those who imagined that the powers of the government which it proposed to establish might, in some possible mode, be exerted in measures tending to the abolition of slavery. This suggestion would of course attract much attention in the southern conventions. In that of Virginia, Governor Randolph ⁴ said:

I hope there is none here, who considering the subject in the calm light of philosophy, will make an objection dishonorable to Virginia; that, at the moment they are securing the rights of their citizens, an objection is started, that there is a spark of hope that those unfortunate men now held in bondage may, by the operation of the general government, be made free.

At the very first Congress, petitions on the subject were presented, if I mistake not, from

⁴ Edmund Randolph (1753-1813) was governor of Virginia, 1786-1788.

different states. The Pennsylvania society for promoting the abolition of slavery took a lead, and laid before Congress a memorial, praying Congress to promote the abolition by such powers as it possessed. This memorial was referred, in the House of Representatives, to a select committee, consisting of Mr. Foster of New Hampshire,⁵ Mr. Gerry of Massachusetts,⁶ Mr. Huntington of Connecticut,⁷ Mr. Lawrence of New York,⁸ Mr. Sinnickson of New Jersey,⁹ Mr. Hartley of Pennsylvania,¹⁰ and Mr. Parker of Virginia ¹¹—all of them, sir, as you will observe, northern men but the last. This committee made a report, which was referred to a committee of the whole House, and there considered and discussed for several days; and being amended, although without material alteration, it was made to express three distinct propositions, on the subject of slavery and the slave trade. First, in the words of the Constitution, that Congress could not, prior to the year 1808, prohibit the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states then existing should think proper to admit; and secondly, that Congress had authority to restrain the citizens of the United States from carrying on the African slave trade, for the purpose of supplying foreign countries. On this proposition, our early laws against those who engage in that traffic are founded. The third proposition, and that which bears on the present question, was expressed in the following terms:

Resolved, That Congress have no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them in any of the states; it remaining with the several states alone

⁵ Abiel Foster (1735-1806) served in the House of Representatives, 1789-1791 and 1795-1803.

⁶ Elbridge Gerry (1744-1814) served in the House of Representatives, 1789-1793. He was vice president of the United States, 1813-1814.

⁷ Benjamin Huntington (1736-1800) served in the House of Representatives, 1789-1791.

⁸ John Laurance (1750-1810) served in the House of Representatives, 1789-1793, and in the Senate, 1796-1800.

⁹ Thomas Sinnickson (1744-1817) served in the House of Representatives, 1789-1791 and 1797-1799.

¹⁰ Thomas Hartley (1748-1800) served in the House of Representatives, 1789-1800.

¹¹ Josiah Parker (1751-1810) served in the House of Representatives, 1789-1801.

to provide rules and regulations therein which humanity and true policy may require.

This resolution received the sanction of the House of Representatives so early as March, 1790. And now, sir, the honorable member will allow me to remind him, that not only were the select committee who reported the resolution, with a single exception, all northern men, but also that, of the members then composing the House of Representatives, a large majority, I believe nearly two-thirds, were northern men also.

The House agreed to insert these resolutions in its journal; and from that day to this it has never been maintained or contended at the North, that Congress had any authority to regulate or interfere with the condition of slaves in the several states. No northern gentleman, to my knowledge, has moved any such question in either House of Congress.

"THE DOMESTIC SLAVERY OF THE SOUTHERN
STATES. . . IS THEIR AFFAIR"

The fears of the South, whatever fears they might have entertained, were allayed and quieted by this early decision; and so remained till they were excited afresh, without cause but for collateral and indirect purposes. When it became necessary, or was thought so, by some political persons, to find an unvarying ground for the exclusion of northern men from confidence and from lead in the affairs of the republic, then, and not till then, the cry was raised, and the feeling industriously excited, that the influence of northern men in the public counsels would endanger the relation of master and slave. For myself, I claim no other merit than that this gross and enormous injustice towards the whole North has not wrought upon me to change my opinions or my political conduct. I hope I am above violating my principles, even under the smart of injury and false imputations. Unjust suspicions and undeserved reproach, whatever pain I may experience from them, will not induce me, I trust, to overstep the limits of constitutional duty, or to encroach on the rights of others. The domestic slavery of the southern

states I leave where I find it, in the hands of their own governments. It is their affair, not mine. Nor do I complain of the peculiar effect which the magnitude of that population has had in the distribution of power under this federal government. We know, sir, that the representation of the states in the other house is not equal. We know that great advantage in that respect is enjoyed by the slaveholding states; and we know, too, that the intended equivalent for that advantage, that is to say, the imposition of direct taxes in the same ratio, has become merely nominal, the habit of the government being almost invariably to collect its revenue from other sources and in other modes. Nevertheless, I do not complain; nor would I countenance any movement to alter this arrangement of representation. It is the original bargain, the compact; let it stand; let the advantage of it be fully enjoyed. The Union itself is too full of benefit to be hazarded in propositions for changing its original basis. I go for the Constitution as it is, and for the Union as it is. But I am resolved not to submit in silence to accusations, either against myself individually or against the North, wholly unfounded and unjust; accusations which impute to us a disposition to evade the constitutional compact, and to extend the power of the government over the internal laws and domestic condition of the states. All such accusations, wherever and whenever made, all insinuations of the existence of any such purposes, I know and feel to be groundless and injurious. And we must confide in southern gentlemen themselves; we must trust to those whose integrity of heart and magnanimity of feeling will lead them to a desire to maintain and disseminate truth, and who possess the means of its diffusion with the southern public; we must leave it to them to disabuse that public of its prejudices. But in the meantime, for my own part, I shall continue to act justly, whether those towards whom justice is exercised receive it with candor or with contumely.

THE ORDINANCE OF 1787

Having had occasion to recur to the Ordinance of 1787, in order to defend myself against the inferences which the honorable

member has chosen to draw from my former observations on that subject, I am not willing now entirely to take leave of it without another remark. It need hardly be said, that that paper expresses just sentiments on the great subject of civil and religious liberty. Such sentiments were common, and abound in all our state papers of that day. But this ordinance did that which was not so common, and which is not even now universal; that is, it set forth and declared it to be a high and binding duty of government itself to support schools and advance the means of education, on the plain reason that religion, morality, and knowledge are necessary to good government, and to the happiness of mankind. One observation further. The important provision incorporated into the Constitution of the United States, and into several of those of the states, and recently, as we have seen, adopted into the reformed constitution of Virginia, restraining legislative power in questions of private right, and from impairing the obligation of contracts, is first introduced and established, as far as I am informed, as matter of express written constitutional law, in this Ordinance of 1787. And I must add, also, in regard to the author of the ordinance, who has not had the happiness to attract the gentleman's notice heretofore, nor to avoid his sarcasm now, that he was chairman of that select committee of the old Congress, whose report first expressed the strong sense of that body, that the old Confederation was not adequate to the exigencies of the country and recommended to the states to send delegates to the convention which formed the present Constitution.

An attempt has been made to transfer from the North to the South the honor of this exclusion of slavery from the Northwestern Territory. The journal, without argument or comment, refutes such attempts. The cession by Virginia was made in March, 1784. On the 19th of April following, a committee, consisting of Messrs. Jefferson,¹² Chase,¹³ and Howell,¹⁴ re-

¹² Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) served in the Continental Congress, 1775-1776 and 1783-1784. He was president of the United States, 1801-1809.

¹³ Jeremiah T. Chase (1748-1828) served in the Continental Congress, 1783-1784.

¹⁴ David Howell (1747-1824) served in the Continental Congress, 1782-1785.

ported a plan for a temporary government of the territory, in which was this article: "That, after the year 1800, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said States, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been convicted." Mr. Spaight of North Carolina¹⁵ moved to strike out this paragraph. The question was put, according to the form then practised, "Shall these words stand as a part of the plan?" New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, seven states, voted in the affirmative; Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, in the negative. North Carolina was divided. As the consent of nine states was necessary, the words could not stand, and were struck out accordingly. Mr. Jefferson voted for the clause, but was overruled by his colleagues.

In March of the next year (1785), Mr. King of Massachusetts,¹⁶ seconded by Mr. Ellery of Rhode Island,¹⁷ proposed the formerly rejected article, with this addition: "And that this regulation shall be an article of compact, and remain a fundamental principle of the constitutions between the thirteen original States, and each of the States described in the resolve." On this clause, which provided the adequate and thorough security, the eight northern states at that time voted affirmatively, and the four southern states negatively. The votes of nine states were not yet obtained, and thus the provision was again rejected by the southern states. The perseverance of the North held out, and two years afterwards the object was attained. It is no derogation from the credit, whatever that may be, of drawing the ordinance, that its principles had before been prepared and discussed, in the form of resolutions. If one should reason in that way, what would become of the distinguished honor of the author of the Declaration of Independence? There is not a sentiment in that paper which had not been voted and resolved

¹⁵ Richard D. Spaight (1758-1802) served in the Continental Congress, 1783-1785, and in the House of Representatives, 1798-1801.

¹⁶ Rufus King (1755-1827) served in the Continental Congress, 1784-1787. He represented New York in the Senate, 1789-1796.

¹⁷ William Ellery (1727-1820) served in the Continental Congress, 1776-1785.

in the assemblies, and other popular bodies in the country, over and over again.

THE HARTFORD CONVENTION

But the honorable member has now found out that this gentleman, Mr. Dane, was a member of the Hartford Convention.¹⁸ However uninformed the honorable member may be of characters and occurrences at the North, it would seem that he has at his elbow, on this occasion, some high-minded and lofty spirit, some magnanimous and true-hearted monitor, possessing the means of local knowledge, and ready to supply the honorable member with everything, down even to forgotten and moth-eaten two-penny pamphlets, which may be used to the disadvantage of his own country. But as to the Hartford Convention, sir, allow me to say, that the proceedings of that body seem now to be less read and studied in New England than farther South. They appear to be looked to, not in New England, but elsewhere, for the purpose of seeing how far they may serve as a precedent. But they will not answer the purpose, they are quite too tame. The latitude in which they originated was too cold. Other conventions, of more recent existence, have gone a whole bar's length beyond it. The learned doctors of Colleton and Abbeville have pushed their commentaries on the Hartford collect so far, that the original text writers are thrown entirely into the shade. I have nothing to do, sir, with the Hartford Convention. Its journal, which the gentleman has quoted, I never read. So far as the honorable member may discover in its proceedings a spirit in any degree resembling that which was avowed and justified in those other conventions to which I have alluded, or so far as those proceedings can be shown to be disloyal to the Constitution, or tending to disunion, so far I shall be as ready as

¹⁸ The convention, held from December 15, 1814 to January 5, 1815, was attended by Federalist delegates from several New England states. The meeting grew out of New England resentment at the embargo on trade with Britain during the War of 1812. Among other resolutions adopted was one prohibiting embargoes lasting more than sixty days. Because the convention had met in secret, it was later accused by some of having been a treasonous conspiracy.

anyone to bestow on them reprehension and censure.

"THIS ALLEGED CONTRADICTION"

Having dwelt long on this convention, and other occurrences of that day, in the hope, probably, (which will not be gratified) that I should leave the course of this debate to follow him at length in those excursions, the honorable member returned, and attempted another object. He referred to a speech of mine in the other house, the same which I had occasion to allude to myself, the other day; and has quoted a passage or two from it, with a bold, though uneasy and laboring, air of confidence, as if he had detected in me an inconsistency. Judging from the gentleman's manner, a stranger to the course of the debate and to the point in discussion would have imagined, from so triumphant a tone, that the honorable member was about to overwhelm me with a manifest contradiction. Anyone who heard him, and who had not heard what I had, in fact, previously said, must have thought me routed and discomfited, as the gentleman had promised. Sir, a breath blows all this triumph away. There is not the slightest difference in the purport of my remarks on the two occasions. What I said here on Wednesday is in exact accordance with the opinion expressed by me in the other house in 1825. Though the gentleman had the metaphysics of Hudibras, though he were able

to sever and divide
A hair twixt north and northwest side,

he yet could not insert his metaphysical scissors between the fair reading of my remarks in 1825, and what I said here last week. There is not only no contradiction, no difference, but, in truth, too exact a similarity, both in thought and language, to be entirely in just taste. I had myself quoted the same speech; had recurred to it, and spoke with it open before me; and much of what I said was little more than a repetition from it. In order to make finishing work with this alleged contradiction, permit me to recur to the origin of this debate, and review its course. This seems expedient, and may be done as well now as at any time.

Well, then, its history is this. The honorable member from Connecticut ¹⁹ moved a resolution, which constitutes the first branch of that which is now before us; that is to say, a resolution, instructing the committee on public lands to inquire into the expediency of limiting, for a certain period, the sales of the public lands, to such as have heretofore been offered for sale; and whether sundry offices connected with the sales of the lands might not be abolished without detriment to the public service. In the progress of the discussion which arose on this resolution, an honorable member from New Hampshire ²⁰ moved to amend the resolution, so as entirely to reverse its object; that is, to strike it all out, and insert a direction to the committee to inquire into the expediency of adopting measures to hasten the sales, and extend more rapidly the surveys, of the lands.

The honorable member from Maine ²¹ suggested that both those propositions might well enough go for consideration to the committee; and in this state of the question, the member from South Carolina addressed the Senate in his first speech. He rose, he said, to give us his own free thoughts on the public lands. I saw him rise with pleasure, and listened with expectation, though before he concluded I was filled with surprise. Certainly, I was never more surprised, than to find him following up, to the extent he did, the sentiments and opinions which the gentleman from Missouri had put forth, and which it is known he has long entertained.

I need not repeat at large the general topics of the honorable gentleman's speech. When he said yesterday that he did not attack the eastern states, he certainly must have forgotten, not only particular remarks, but the whole drift and tenor of his speech; unless he means by not attacking, that he did not commence hostilities, but that another had preceded him in the attack. He, in the first place, disapproved of the whole course of the government, for forty years, in regard to its disposition of the public

lands; and then, turning northward and eastward, and fancying he had found a cause for alleged narrowness and niggardliness in the "accursed policy" of the tariff, to which he represented the people of New England as wedded, he went on for a full hour with remarks, the whole scope of which was to exhibit the results of this policy, in feelings and in measures unfavorable to the West. I thought his opinions unfounded and erroneous, as to the general course of the government, and ventured to reply to them.

"THE APPEARANCE OF ANALOGY"

The gentleman had remarked on the analogy of other cases, and quoted the conduct of European governments towards their own subjects settling on this continent, as in point, to show that we had been harsh and rigid in selling, when we should have given the public lands to settlers without price. I thought the honorable member had suffered his judgment to be betrayed by a false analogy; that he was struck with an appearance of resemblance where there was no real similitude. I think so still. The first settlers of North America were enterprising spirits, engaged in private adventure, or fleeing from tyranny at home. When arrived here, they were forgotten by the mother country, or remembered only to be oppressed. Carried away again by the appearance of analogy, or struck with the eloquence of the passage, the honorable member yesterday observed, that the conduct of government towards the western emigrants, or my representation of it, brought to his mind a celebrated speech in the British Parliament. It was, sir, the speech of Colonel Barre. On the question of the stamp act, or tea tax, I forget which, Colonel Barre had heard a member on the treasury bench argue, that the people of the United States, being British colonists, planted by the maternal care, nourished by the indulgence, and protected by the arms of England, would not grudge their mite to relieve the mother country from the heavy burden under which she groaned. The language of Colonel Barre, in reply to this, was, "They planted by your care? Your oppression planted them in America. They fled from your tyranny,

¹⁹ Samuel A. Foot (1780-1846) served in the Senate, 1827-1833.

²⁰ Levi Woodbury (1789-1851) served in the Senate, 1825-1831 and 1841-1845.

²¹ Peleg Sprague (1793-1880) served in the Senate, 1829-1835.

and grew by your neglect of them. So soon as you began to care for them, you showed your care by sending persons to spy out their liberties, misrepresent their character, prey upon them, and eat out their substance."

And how does the honorable gentleman mean to maintain, that language like this is applicable to the conduct of the government of the United States towards the western emigrants, or to any representation given by me of that conduct? Were the settlers in the West driven thither by our oppression? Have they flourished only by our neglect of them? Has the government done nothing but prey upon them, and eat out their substance? Sir, this fervid eloquence of the British speaker, just when and where it was uttered, and fit to remain an exercise for the schools, is not a little out of place, when it is brought thence to be applied here, to the conduct of our own country towards her own citizens. From America to England, it may be true; from Americans to their own government, it would be strange language. Let us leave it, to be recited and declaimed by our boys against a foreign nation; not introduce it here, to recite and declaim ourselves against our own.

But I come to the point of the alleged contradiction. In my remarks on Wednesday, I contended that we could not give away gratuitously all the public lands; that we held them in trust; that the government had solemnly pledged itself to dispose of them as a common fund for the common benefit, and to sell and settle them as its discretion should dictate. Now, sir, what contradiction does the gentleman find to this sentiment in the speech of 1825? He quotes me as having then said, that we ought not to hug these lands as a very great treasure. Very well, sir, supposing me to be accurately reported in that expression, what is the contradiction? I have not now said, that we should hug these lands as a favorite source of pecuniary income. No such thing. It is not my view. What I have said, and what I do say, is, that they are a common fund, to be disposed of for the common benefit, to be sold at low prices for the accommodation of settlers, keeping the object of settling the lands as much in view as that of raising money from them. This I say now, and this I have always said. Is this hug-

ging them as a favorite treasure? Is there no difference between hugging and hoarding this fund, on the one hand, as a great treasure, and, on the other, of disposing of it at low prices, placing the proceeds in the general treasury of the Union? My opinion is, that as much is to be made of the land as fairly and reasonably may be, selling it all the while at such rates as to give the fullest effect to settlement. This is not giving it all away to the states, as the gentleman would propose; nor is it hugging the fund closely and tenaciously, as a favorite treasure; but it is, in my judgment, a just and wise policy, perfectly according with all the various duties which rest in government. So much for my contradiction. And what is it? Where is the ground of the gentleman's triumph? What inconsistency in word or doctrine has he been able to detect? Sir, if this be a sample of that discomfiture with which the honorable gentleman threatened me, commend me to the word *discomfiture* for the rest of my life.

But, after all, this is not the point of the debate; and I must now bring the gentleman back to what is the point.

NEW ENGLAND HAS NOT RETARDED WESTERN POPULATION

The real question between me and him is, has the doctrine been advanced at the South or the East, that the population of the West should be retarded, or at least need not be hastened, on account of its effect to drain off the people from the Atlantic states? Is this doctrine, as has been alleged, of eastern origin? That is the question. Has the gentleman found anything by which he can make good his accusation? I submit to the Senate, that he has entirely failed; and, as far as this debate has shown, the only person who has advanced such sentiments is a gentleman from South Carolina, and a friend of the honorable member himself. The honorable gentleman has given no answer to this; there is none which can be given. The simple fact, while it requires no comment to enforce it, defies all argument to refute it. I could refer to the speeches of another southern gentleman, in years before, of the same general character, and to the same effect, as that which has been

quoted; but I will not consume the time of the Senate by the reading of them.

So then, sir, New England is guiltless of the policy of retarding western population, and of all envy and jealousy of the growth of the new states. Whatever there be of that policy in the country, no part of it is hers. If it has a local habitation, the honorable member has probably seen by this time where to look for it; and if it now has received a name, he has himself christened it.

We approach, at length, sir, to a more important part of the honorable gentleman's observations. Since it does not accord with my views of justice and policy to give away the public lands altogether, as a mere matter of gratuity, I am asked by the honorable gentleman on what ground it is that I consent to vote them away in particular instances. How, he inquires, do I reconcile with these professed sentiments, my support of measures appropriating portions of the lands to particular roads, particular canals, particular rivers, and particular institutions of education in the West? This leads, sir, to the real and wide difference in political opinion between the honorable gentleman and myself. On my part, I look upon all these objects as connected with the common good, fairly embraced in its object and its terms; he, on the contrary, deems them all, if good at all, only local good. This is our difference. The interrogatory which he proceeded to put, at once explains this difference. "What interest," asks he, "has South Carolina in a canal in Ohio?" Sir, this very question is full of significance. It develops the gentleman's whole political system; and its answer expounds mine. Here we differ. I look upon a road over the Alleghanies, a canal round the falls of the Ohio, or a canal or railway from the Atlantic to the western waters, as being an object large and extensive enough to be fairly said to be for the common benefit. The gentleman thinks otherwise, and this is the key to his construction of the powers of the government. He may well ask what interest has South Carolina in a canal in Ohio. On his system, it is true, she has no interest. On that system, Ohio and Carolina are different governments, and different countries; connected here, it is true, by some slight and ill-defined bond of union, but

in all main respects separate and diverse. On that system, Carolina has no more interest in a canal in Ohio than in Mexico. The gentleman, therefore, only follows out his own principles; he does no more than arrive at the natural conclusions of his own doctrines; he only announces the true results of that creed which he has adopted himself, and would persuade others to adopt, when he thus declares that South Carolina has no interest in a public work in Ohio.

"WE LOOK UPON THE STATES . . . AS UNITED"

Sir, we narrow-minded people of New England do not reason thus. Our *notion* of things is entirely different. We look upon the states, not as separated, but as united. We love to dwell on that union, and on the mutual happiness which it has so much promoted, and the common renown which it has so greatly contributed to acquire. In our contemplation, Carolina and Ohio are parts of the same country; states, united under the same general government, having interests, common, associated, intermingled. In whatever is within the proper sphere of the constitutional power of this government, we look upon the states as one. We do not impose geographical limits to our patriotic feeling or regard; we do not follow rivers and mountains, and lines of latitude, to find boundaries, beyond which public improvements do not benefit us. We who come here, as agents and representatives of these narrow-minded and selfish men of New England, consider ourselves as bound to regard with an equal eye the good of the whole, in whatever is within our powers of legislation. Sir, if a railroad or canal, beginning in South Carolina and ending in South Carolina, appeared to me to be of national importance and national magnitude, believing, as I do that the power of government extends to the encouragement of works of that description, if I were to stand up here and ask, What interest has Massachusetts in a railroad in South Carolina? I should not be willing to face my constituents. These same narrow-minded men would tell me, that they had sent me to act for the whole country, and that one who possessed too

little comprehension, either of intellect or feeling, one who was not large enough, both in mind and in heart, to embrace the whole, was not fit to be intrusted with the interest of any part.

Sir, I do not desire to enlarge the powers of the government by unjustifiable construction, nor to exercise any not within a fair interpretation. But when it is believed that a power does exist, then it is, in my judgment, to be exercised for the general benefit of the whole. So far as respects the exercise of such a power, the states are one. It was the very object of the Constitution to create unity of interests to the extent of the powers of the general government. In war and peace we are one; in commerce, one; because the authority of the general government reaches to war and peace, and to the regulation of commerce. I have never seen any more difficulty in erecting lighthouses on the lakes, than on the ocean; in improving the harbors of inland seas, than if they were within the ebb and flow of the tide; or in removing obstructions in the vast streams of the West, more than in any work to facilitate commerce on the Atlantic coast. If there be any power for one, there is power also for the other; and they are all and equally for the common good of the country.

There are other objects, apparently more local, or the benefit of which is less general, towards which, nevertheless, I have concurred with others, to give aid by donations of land. It is proposed to construct a road, in or through one of the new states, in which this government possesses large quantities of land. Have the United States no right, or, as a great and untaxed proprietor, are they under no obligation to contribute to an object thus calculated to promote the common good of all the proprietors, themselves included? And even with respect to education, which is the extreme case, let the question be considered. In the first place, as we have seen, it was made matter of compact with these states, that they should do their part to promote education. In the next place, our whole system of land laws proceeds on the idea that education is for the common good; because, in every division, a certain portion is uniformly reserved and appropriated for the use

of schools. And, finally, have not these new states singularly strong claims, founded on the ground already stated, that the government is a great untaxed proprietor, in the ownership of the soil? It is a consideration of great importance, that probably there is in no part of the country, or of the world, so great call for the means of education, as in these new states, owing to the vast numbers of persons within those ages in which education and instruction are usually received, if received at all. This is the natural consequence of recency of settlement and rapid increase. The census of these states shows how great a proportion of the whole population occupies the classes between infancy and manhood. These are the wide fields, and here is the deep and quick soil for the seeds of knowledge and virtue; and this is the favored season, the very springtime for sowing them. Let them be disseminated without stint. Let them be scattered with a bountiful hand, broadcast. Whatever the government can fairly do towards these objects, in my opinion, ought to be done.

These, sir, are the grounds, succinctly stated, on which my votes for grants of lands for particular objects rest; while I maintain, at the same time, that it is all a common fund, for the common benefit. And reasons like these, I presume, have influenced the votes of other gentlemen from New England. Those who have a different view of the powers of the government, of course, come to different conclusions, on these, as on other questions. I observed, when speaking on this subject before, that if we looked to any measure, whether for a road, a canal, or anything else, intended for the improvement of the West, it would be found that, if the New England *ayes* were struck out of the lists of votes, the southern *noes* would always have rejected the measure. The truth of this has not been denied, and cannot be denied. In stating this, I thought it just to ascribe it to the constitutional scruples of the South, rather than to any other less favorable or less charitable cause. But no sooner had I done this, than the honorable gentleman asks if I reproach him and his friends with their constitutional scruples. Sir, I reproach nobody. I stated a fact, and gave the most respectful reason for it that occurred

to me. The gentleman cannot deny the fact; he may, if he choose, disclaim the reason. It is not long since I had occasion, in presenting a petition from his own state, to account for its being intrusted to my hands, by saying, that the constitutional opinions of the gentleman and his worthy colleague prevented them from supporting it. Sir, did I state this as matter of reproach? Far from it. Did I attempt to find any other cause than an honest one for these scruples? Sir, I did not. It did not become me to doubt or to insinuate that the gentleman had either changed his sentiments, or that he had made up a set of constitutional opinions accommodated to any particular combination of political occurrences. Had I done so, I should have felt, that, while I was entitled to little credit in thus questioning other people's motives, I justified the whole world in suspecting my own. But how has the gentleman returned this respect for others' opinions? His own candor and justice, how have they been exhibited towards the motives of others, while he has been at so much pains to maintain, what nobody has disputed, the purity of his own? Why, sir, he has asked *when*, and *how*, and *why* New England votes were found going for measures favorable to the West. He has demanded to be informed whether all this did not begin in 1825, and while the election of president was still pending.

"NEW ENGLAND HAS SUPPORTED MEASURES FAVORABLE
TO THE WEST"

Sir, to these questions retort would be justified; and it is both cogent and at hand. Nevertheless, I will answer the inquiry, not by retort, but by facts. I will tell the gentleman *when*, and *how*, and *why* New England has supported measures favorable to the West. I have already referred to the early history of the government, to the first acquisition of the lands, to the original laws for disposing of them, and for governing the territories where they lie; and have shown the influence of New England men and New England principles in all these leading measures. I should not be pardoned were I to go over that ground again. Coming to more recent times, and to measures of a less general character, I have endeavored to prove that ev-

erything of this kind, designed for western improvement, has depended on the votes of New England; all this is true beyond the power of contradiction. And now, sir, there are two measures to which I will refer, not so ancient as to belong to the early history of the public lands, and not so recent as to be on this side of the period when the gentleman charitably imagines a new direction may have been given to New England feeling and New England votes. These measures, and the New England votes in support of them, may be taken as samples and specimens of all the rest.

In 1820 (observe, Mr. President, in 1820) the people of the West besought Congress for a reduction in the price of lands. In favor of that reduction, New England, with a delegation of 40 members in the other house, gave 33 votes, and one only against it. The four southern states, with more than 50 members, gave 32 votes for it, and 7 against it. Again, in 1821 (observe again, sir, the time), the law passed for the relief of the purchasers of the public lands. This was a measure of vital importance to the West, and more especially to the Southwest. It authorized the relinquishment of contracts for lands which had been entered into at high prices, and a reduction in other cases of not less than 37½ percent on the purchase money. Many millions of dollars, six or seven, I believe, probably much more, were relinquished by this law. On this bill, New England, with her 40 members, gave more affirmative votes than the four southern states, with their 52 or 53 members. These two are far the most important general measures respecting the public lands which have been adopted within the last twenty years. They took place in 1820 and 1821. That is the time *when*.

As to the manner *how*, the gentleman already sees that it was by voting in solid column for the required relief; and, lastly, as to the cause *why*, I tell the gentleman it was because the members from New England thought the measures just and salutary; because they entertained towards the West neither envy, hatred, nor malice; because they deemed it becoming them, as just and enlightened public men, to meet the exigency which had arisen in the West with the appropriate measure of relief; because they felt

it due to their own characters, and the characters of their New England predecessors in this government, to act towards the new states in the spirit of a liberal, patronizing, magnanimous policy. So much, sir, for the cause *why*; and I hope that by this time, sir, the honorable gentleman is satisfied; if not, I do not know *when*, or *how*, or *why* he ever will be.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS BEGAN AFTER 1815

Having recurred to these two important measures, in answer to the gentleman's inquiries, I must now beg permission to go back to a period somewhat earlier, for the purpose of still further showing how much, or rather how little, reason there is for the gentleman's insinuation that political hopes or fears, or party associations, were the grounds of these New England votes. And after what has been said, I hope it may be forgiven me if I allude to some political opinions and votes of my own, of very little public importance certainly, but which, from the time at which they were given and expressed, may pass for good witnesses on this occasion.

This government, Mr. President, from its origin to the peace of 1815, had been too much engrossed with various other important concerns to be able to turn its thoughts inward, and look to the development of its vast internal resources. In the early part of President Washington's administration,²² it was fully occupied with completing its own organization, providing for the public debt, defending the frontiers, and maintaining domestic peace. Before the termination of that administration, the fires of the French Revolution blazed forth, as from a new-opened volcano, and the whole breadth of the ocean did not secure us from its effects. The smoke and the cinders reached us, though not the burning lava. Difficult and agitating questions, embarrassing to government and dividing public opinion, sprung out of the new state of our foreign relations, and were succeeded by others, and yet again by others, equally embarrassing and equally exciting division and dis-

cord, through the long series of twenty years, till they finally issued in the war with England. Down to the close of that war, no distinct, marked, and deliberate attention had been given, or could have been given, to the internal condition of the country, its capacities of improvement, or the constitutional power of the government in regard to objects connected with such improvement.

The peace, Mr. President, brought about an entirely new and a most interesting state of things; it opened to us other prospects and suggested other duties. We ourselves were changed, and the whole world was changed. The pacification of Europe, after June 1815, assumed a firm and permanent aspect. The nations evidently manifested that they were disposed for peace. Some agitation of the waves might be expected, even after the storm had subsided, but the tendency was, strongly and rapidly, towards settled repose.

It so happened, sir, that I was at that time a member of Congress, and, like others, naturally turned my thoughts to the contemplation of the recently altered condition of the country and of the world. It appeared plainly enough to me, as well as to wiser and more experienced men, that the policy of the government would naturally take a start in a new direction; because new directions would necessarily be given to the pursuits and occupations of the people. We had pushed our commerce far and fast, under the advantage of a neutral flag. But there were now no longer flags, either neutral or belligerent. The harvest of neutrality had been great, but we had gathered it all. With the peace of Europe, it was obvious there would spring up in her circle of nations a revived and invigorated spirit of trade, and a new activity in all the business and objects of civilized life. Hereafter, our commercial gains were to be earned only by success in a close and intense competition. Other nations would produce for themselves, and carry for themselves, and manufacture for themselves, to the full extent of their abilities. The crops of our plains would no longer sustain European armies, nor our ships longer supply those whom war had rendered unable to supply themselves. It was obvious, that, under these circumstances, the country would begin to

²² George Washington (1732-1799) was president of the United States, 1789-1797.

survey itself, and to estimate its own capacity of improvement.

And this improvement, how was it to be accomplished, and who was to accomplish it? We were ten or twelve millions of people, spread over almost half a world. We were more than twenty states, some stretching along the same seaboard, some along the same line of inland frontier, and others on opposite banks of the same vast rivers. Two considerations at once presented themselves with great force, in looking at this state of things. One was, that that great branch of improvement which consisted in furnishing new facilities of intercourse necessarily ran into different states in every leading instance, and would benefit the citizens of all such states. No one state, therefore, in such cases, would assume the whole expense, nor was the cooperation of several states to be expected. Take the instance of the Delaware breakwater. It will cost several millions of money. Would Pennsylvania alone ever have constructed it? Certainly never, while this Union lasts, because it is not for her sole benefit. Would Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware have united to accomplish it at their joint expense? Certainly not, for the same reason. It could not be done, therefore, but by the general government. The same may be said of the large inland undertakings, except that, in them, government, instead of bearing the whole expense, cooperates with others who bear a part. The other consideration is, that the United States have the means. They enjoy the revenues derived from commerce, and the states have no abundant and easy sources of public income. The customhouses fill the general treasury, while the states have scanty resources, except by resort to heavy direct taxes.

Under this view of things, I thought it necessary to settle, at least for myself, some definite notions with respect to the powers of the government in regard to internal affairs. It may not savor too much of self-commendation to remark, that, with this object, I considered the Constitution, its judicial construction, its contemporaneous exposition, and the whole history of the legislation of Congress under it; and I arrived at the conclusion, that government had power to accomplish sundry objects, or aid in

their accomplishment, which are now commonly spoken of as INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS. That conclusion, sir, may have been right, or it may have been wrong. I am not about to argue the grounds of it at large. I say only, that it was adopted and acted on even so early as in 1816. Yes, Mr. President, I made up my opinion, and determined on my intended course of political conduct, on these subjects, in the Fourteenth Congress, in 1816. And now, Mr. President, I have further to say, that I made up these opinions, and entered on this course of political conduct, *Teucro duce*. Yes, sir, I pursued in all this a South Carolina track on the doctrines of internal improvement. South Carolina, as she was then represented in the other house, set forth in 1816 under a fresh and leading breeze, and I was among the followers. But if my leader sees new lights and turns a sharp corner, unless I see new lights also, I keep straight on in the same path. I repeat, that leading gentlemen from South Carolina were first and foremost in behalf of the doctrines of internal improvements, when those doctrines came first to be considered and acted upon in Congress. The debate on the bank question, on the tariff of 1816, and on the direct tax, will show who was who, and what was what, at that time.

"A SOUTH CAROLINA TARIFF"

The tariff of 1816, (one of the plain cases of oppression and usurpation, from which, if the government does not recede, individual states may justly secede from the government) is, sir, in truth, a South Carolina tariff, supported by South Carolina votes. But for those votes, it could not have passed in the form in which it did pass; whereas, if it had depended on Massachusetts votes, it would have been lost. Does not the honorable gentleman well know all this? There are certainly those who do, full well, know it all. I do not say this to reproach South Carolina. I only state the fact; and I think it will appear to be true, that among the earliest and boldest advocates of the tariff, as a measure of protection, and on the express ground of protection, were leading gentlemen of South Carolina in Congress. I did not then, and cannot now, understand their language in any other

sense. While this tariff of 1816 was under discussion in the House of Representatives, an honorable gentleman from Georgia²³ now of this house, moved to reduce the proposed duty on cotton. He failed, by 4 votes, South Carolina giving 3 votes (enough to have turned the scale) against his motion. The act, sir, then passed, and received on its passage the support of a majority of the representatives of South Carolina present and voting. This act is the first in the order of those now denounced as plain usurpations. We see it daily in the list, by the side of those of 1824 and 1828, as a case of manifest oppression, justifying disunion. I put it home to the honorable member from South Carolina, that his own state was not only "art and part" in this measure, but the *causa causans*. Without her aid, this seminal principle of mischief, this root of Upas, could not have been planted. I have already said, and it is true, that this act proceeded on the ground of protection. It interfered directly with existing interests of great value and amount. It cut up the Calcutta cotton trade by the roots, but it passed, nevertheless, and it passed on the principle of protecting manufactures, on the principle against free trade, on the principle opposed to that which lets us alone.

Such, Mr. President, were the opinions of important and leading gentlemen from South Carolina, on the subject of internal improvement, in 1816. I went out of Congress the next year, and, returning again in 1823, thought I found South Carolina where I had left her. I really supposed that all things remained as they were, and that the South Carolina doctrine of internal improvements would be defended by the same eloquent voices, and the same strong arms, as formerly. In the lapse of these six years, it is true, political associations had assumed a new aspect and new divisions. A strong party had arisen in the South hostile to the doctrine of internal improvements. Anticonsolidation was the flag under which this party fought; and its supporters inveighed against internal improvements, much after the manner in

which the honorable gentleman has now inveighed against them, as part and parcel of the system of consolidation. Whether this party arose in South Carolina itself, or in the neighborhood, is more than I know. I think the latter. However that may have been, there were those found in South Carolina ready to make war upon it, and who did make intrepid war upon it. Names being regarded as things in such controversies, they bestowed on the anti-improvement gentlemen the appellation of radicals. Yes, sir, the appellation of radicals, as a term of distinction applicable and applied to those who denied the liberal doctrines of internal improvement, originated, according to the best of my recollection, somewhere between North Carolina and Georgia. Well, sir, these mischievous radicals were to be put down, and the strong arm of South Carolina was stretched out to put them down. About this time I returned to Congress. The battle with the radicals had been fought, and our South Carolina champions of the doctrines of internal improvement had nobly maintained their ground, and were understood to have achieved a victory. We looked upon them as conquerors. They had driven back the enemy with discomfiture, a thing, by the way, sir, which is not always performed when it is promised. A gentleman to whom I have already referred in this debate had come into Congress, during my absence from it, from South Carolina, and had brought with him a high reputation for ability. He came from a school with which we had been acquainted, *et noscitur a sociis*. I hold in my hand, sir, a printed speech of this distinguished gentleman,²⁴ "ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS," delivered about the period to which I now refer, and printed with a few introductory remarks upon consolidation; in which, sir, I think he quite consolidated the arguments of his opponents, the Radicals, if to *crush* be to consolidate. I give you a short but significant quotation from these remarks. He is speaking of a pamphlet, then recently published, entitled "Consolidation"; and having alluded to the question of renewing the

²³ John Forsyth (1780-1841) served in the House of Representatives, 1813-1818 and 1823-1827. He served in the Senate, 1818-1819 and 1829-1834.

²⁴ George McDuffie of South Carolina (1790-1851) served in the House of Representatives, 1821-1834, and in the Senate, 1842-1846.

charter of the former Bank of the United States, he says:

Moreover, in the early history of parties, and when Mr. Crawford advocated a renewal of the old charter, it was considered a Federal measure; which internal improvement *never was*, as this author erroneously states. This latter measure originated in the administration of Mr. Jefferson, with the appropriation for the Cumberland Road; and was first proposed, *as a system*, by Mr. Calhoun, and carried through the House of Representatives by a large majority of the Republicans, including almost every one of the leading men who carried us through the late war.

So, then, internal improvement is not one of the Federal heresies. One paragraph more, sir:

The author in question, not content with denouncing as Federalists, General Jackson, Mr. Adams, Mr. Calhoun, and the majority of the South Carolina delegation in Congress, modestly extends the denunciation to Mr. Monroe and the whole Republican party. Here are his words: "During the administration of Mr. Monroe much has passed which the Republican party would be glad to approve if they could! But the principal feature, and that which has chiefly elicited these observations, is the renewal of the SYSTEM OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS." Now this measure was adopted by a vote of 115 to 86 of a Republican Congress, and sanctioned by a Republican President. Who, then, is this author, who assumes the high prerogative of denouncing, in the name of the Republican party, the Republican administration of the country? A denunciation including within its sweep *Calhoun, Loondes, and Choates*, men who will be regarded as the brightest ornaments of South Carolina, and the strongest pillars of the Republican party, as long as the late war shall be remembered, and talents and patriotism shall be regarded as the proper objects of the admiration and gratitude of a free people!

SUPPORT FOR INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT

Such are the opinions, sir, which were maintained by South Carolina gentlemen, in the House of Representatives, on the subject of internal improvements, when I took my seat there as a member from Massachusetts in 1823. But this is not all. We had a bill before us, and passed it in that house, entitled, "An Act to procure the necessary surveys, plans, and estimates upon the subject of roads and canals." It authorized the president to cause surveys and estimates to be made of the routes of such roads and canals as he might deem of national importance in a commercial or military point of view, or for the transportation of the mail, and appropriated thirty thousand dollars out of the

treasury to defray the expense. This act, though preliminary in its nature, covered the whole ground. It took for granted the complete power of internal improvement, as far as any of its advocates had ever contended for it. Having passed the other house, the bill came up to the Senate, and was here considered and debated in April 1824. The honorable member from South Carolina was a member of the Senate at that time. While the bill was under consideration here, a motion was made to add the following proviso: "*Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to affirm *or admit* a power in Congress, on their own authority, to make roads or canals within any of the states of the Union." The yeas and nays were taken on this proviso, and the honorable member voted *in the negative!* The proviso failed.

A motion was then made to add this proviso, viz.: "*Provided*, That the faith of the United States is hereby pledged, that no money shall ever be expended for roads or canals, except it shall be among the several states, and in the same proportion as direct taxes are laid and assessed by the provisions of the Constitution." The honorable member voted *against this proviso* also, and it failed. The bill was then put on its passage, and the honorable member voted *for it*, and it passed, and became a law.

Now it strikes me, sir, that there is no maintaining these votes, but upon the power of internal improvement, in its broadest sense. In truth, these bills for surveys and estimates have always been considered as test questions; they show who is for and who against internal improvement. This law itself went the whole length, and assumed the full and complete power. The gentleman's votes sustained that power, in every form in which the various propositions to amend presented it. He went for the entire and unrestrained authority, without consulting the states, and without agreeing to any proportionate distribution. And now suffer me to remind you, Mr. President, that it is this very same power, thus sanctioned, in every form, by the gentleman's own opinion, which is so plain and manifest a usurpation, that the state of South Carolina is supposed to be justified in refusing submission to any laws carrying the power into effect. Truly, sir, is not this a

little too hard? May we not crave some mercy, under favor and protection of the gentleman's own authority? Admitting that a road, or a canal, must be written down flat usurpation as was ever committed, may we find no mitigation in our respect for his place, and his vote, as one that knows the law?

The tariff, which South Carolina had an efficient hand in establishing, in 1816, and this asserted power of internal improvement, advanced by her in the same year, and, as we have seen, approved and sanctioned by her representatives in 1824, these two measures are the great grounds on which she is now thought to be justified in breaking up the Union, if she sees fit to break it up!

I may now safely say, I think, that we have had the authority of leading and distinguished gentlemen from South Carolina in support of the doctrine of internal improvement. I repeat, that, up to 1824, I for one followed South Carolina; but when that star, in its ascension, veered off in an unexpected direction, I relied on its light no longer.

[Here the vice president ²⁵ said, "Does the chair understand the gentleman from Massachusetts to say that the person now occupying the chair of the Senate has changed his opinions on the subject of internal improvements?"]

From nothing ever said to me, sir, have I had reason to know of any change in the opinions of the person filling the chair of the Senate. If such change has taken place, I regret it. I speak generally of the state of South Carolina. Individuals we know there are, who hold opinions favorable to the power. An application for its exercise, in behalf of a public work in South Carolina itself, is now pending, I believe, in the other house, presented by members from that state.

I have thus, sir, perhaps not without some tediousness of detail, shown, if I am in error on the subject of internal improvement, how, and in what company, I fell into that error. If I am wrong, it is apparent who misled me.

"AN EXCESSIVE ANXIETY TO PAY OFF THE DEBT"

I go to other remarks of the honorable member; and I have to complain of an entire misapprehension of what I said on the subject of the national debt, though I can hardly perceive how anyone could misunderstand me. What I said was, not that I wished to put off the payment of the debt, but, on the contrary, that I had always voted for every measure for its reduction, as uniformly as the gentleman himself. He seems to claim the exclusive merit of a disposition to reduce the public charge. I do not allow it to him. As a debt, I was, I am for paying it, because it is a charge on our finances, and on the industry of the country. But I observed, that I thought I perceived a morbid fervor on that subject, an excessive anxiety to pay off the debt, not so much because it is a debt simply, as because, while it lasts, it furnishes one objection to disunion. It is, while it continues, a tie of common interest. I did not impute such motives to the honorable member himself, but that there is such a feeling in existence I have not a particle of doubt. The most I said was, that if one effect of the debt was to strengthen our Union, that effect itself was not regretted by me, however much others might regret it. The gentleman has not seen how to reply to this, otherwise than by supposing me to have advanced the doctrine that a national debt is a national blessing. Others, I must hope, will find much less difficulty in understanding me. I distinctly and pointedly cautioned the honorable member not to understand me as expressing an opinion favorable to the continuance of the debt. I repeated this caution, and repeated it more than once; but it was thrown away.

On yet another point, I was still more unaccountably misunderstood. The gentleman had harangued against "consolidation." I told him, in reply, that there was one kind of consolidation to which I was attached, and that was the consolidation of our Union; that this was precisely that consolidation to which I feared others were not attached, and that such consolidation was the very end of the Constitution, the leading object, as they had informed us

²⁵ John C. Calhoun (1782-1850), vice president of the United States, 1825-1832, was presiding over the Senate.

themselves, which its framers had kept in view. I turned to their communication, and read their very words, "the consolidation of the Union," and expressed my devotion to this sort of consolidation. I said, in terms, that I wished not in the slightest degree to augment the powers of this government; that my object was to preserve, not to enlarge; and that by consolidating the Union I understood no more than the strengthening of the Union, and perpetuating it. Having been thus explicit, having thus read from the printed book the precise words which I adopted, as expressing my own sentiments, it passes comprehension how any man could understand me as contending for an extension of the powers of the government, or for consolidation in that odious sense in which it means an accumulation, in the federal government, of the powers properly belonging to the states.

I repeat, sir, that, in adopting the sentiment of the framers of the Constitution, I read their language audibly, and word for word; and I pointed out the distinction, just as fully as I have now done, between the consolidation of the Union and that other obnoxious consolidation which I disclaimed. And yet the honorable member misunderstood me. The gentleman had said that he wished for no fixed revenue—not a shilling. If by a word he could convert the Capitol into gold, he would not do it. Why all this fear of revenue? Why, sir, because, as the gentleman told us, it tends to consolidation. Now this can mean neither more nor less than that a common revenue is a common interest, and that all common interests tend to preserve the union of the states. I confess I like that tendency; if the gentleman dislikes it, he is right in deprecating a shilling of fixed revenue. So much, sir, for consolidation.

"THE SUBJECT OF THE TARIFF"

As well as I recollect the course of his remarks, the honorable gentleman next recurred to the subject of the tariff. He did not doubt the word must be of unpleasant sound to me, and proceeded, with an effort neither new nor attended with new success, to involve me and my votes in inconsistency and contradiction. I

am happy the honorable gentleman has furnished me an opportunity of a timely remark or two on that subject. I was glad he approached it, for it is a question I enter upon without fear from anybody. The strenuous toil of the gentleman has been to raise an inconsistency between my dissent to the tariff in 1824, and my vote in 1828. It is labor lost. He pays undeserved compliment to my speech in 1824; but this is to raise me high, that my fall, as he would have it, in 1828, may be more signal. Sir, there was no fall. Between the ground I stood on in 1824 and that I took in 1828, there was not only no precipice, but no declivity. It was a change of position to meet new circumstances, but on the same level. A plain tale explains the whole matter. In 1816 I had not acquiesced in the tariff, then supported by South Carolina. To some parts of it, especially, I felt and expressed great repugnance. I held the same opinions in 1820, at the meeting in Faneuil Hall, to which the gentleman has alluded. I said then, and say now, that, as an original question, the authority of Congress to exercise the revenue power, with direct reference to the protection of manufactures, is a questionable authority, far more questionable, in my judgment, than the power of internal improvements. I must confess, sir, that in one respect some impression has been made on my opinions lately. Mr. Madison's publication²⁶ has put the power in a very strong light. He has placed it, I must acknowledge, upon grounds of construction and argument which seem impregnable. But even if the power were doubtful, on the face of the Constitution itself, it had been assumed and asserted in the first revenue law ever passed under that same Constitution; and on this ground, as a matter settled by contemporaneous practice, I had refrained from expressing the opinion that the tariff laws transcended constitutional limits, as the gentleman supposes. What I did say at Faneuil Hall, as far as I now remember, was, that this was originally matter of doubtful construction. The gentleman himself, I suppose, thinks there is no doubt about it, and that the laws are plainly against the Constitution. Mr.

²⁶ James Madison, *Letters on the Constitutionality of the Power in Congress to Impose a Tariff for the Protection of Manufactures* (Washington, DC, 1828).

Madison's letters, already referred to, contain, in my judgment, by far the most able exposition extant of this part of the Constitution. He has satisfied me, so far as the practice of the government had left it an open question.

With a great majority of the representatives of Massachusetts, I voted against the tariff of 1824. My reasons were then given, and I will not now repeat them. But, notwithstanding our dissent, the great states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky went for the bill, in almost unbroken column, and it passed. Congress and the president sanctioned it, and it became the law of the land. What, then, were we to do? Our only option was, either to fall in with this settled course of public policy, and accommodate ourselves to it as well as we could, or to embrace the South Carolina doctrine, and talk of nullifying the statute by state interference.

This last alternative did not suit our principles, and of course we adopted the former. In 1827, the subject came again before Congress, on a proposition to afford some relief to the branch of wool and woollens. We looked upon the system of protection as being fixed and settled. The law of 1824 remained. It had gone into full operation, and, in regard to some objects intended by it, perhaps most of them, had produced all its expected effects. No man proposed to repeal it; no man attempted to renew the general contest on its principle. But, owing to subsequent and unforeseen occurrences, the benefit intended by it to wool and woollen fabrics had not been realized. Events not known here when the law passed had taken place, which defeated its object in that particular respect. A measure was accordingly brought forward to meet this precise deficiency, to remedy this particular defect. It was limited to wool and woollens. Was ever anything more reasonable? If the policy of the tariff laws had become established in principle, as the permanent policy of the government, should they not be revised and amended, and made equal, like other laws, as exigencies should arise, or justice require? Because we had doubted about adopting the system, were we to refuse to cure its manifest defects, after it had been adopted, and when no one attempted its repeal? And this, sir, is the

inconsistency so much bruited. I had voted against the tariff of 1824, but it passed; and in 1827 and 1828, I voted to amend it, in a point essential to the interest of my constituents. Where is the inconsistency? Could I do otherwise? Sir, does political consistency consist in always giving negative votes? Does it require of a public man to refuse to concur in amending laws, because they passed against his consent? Having voted against the tariff originally, does consistency demand that I should do all in my power to maintain an unequal tariff, burdensome to my own constituents in many respects, favorable in none? To consistency of that sort, I lay no claim. And there is another sort to which I lay as little, and that is, a kind of consistency by which persons feel themselves as much bound to oppose a proposition after it has become a law of the land as before.

The bill of 1827, limited, as I have said, to the single object in which the tariff of 1824 had manifestly failed in its effect, passed the House of Representatives, but was lost here. We had then the act of 1828. I need not recur to the history of a measure so recent. Its enemies spiced it with whatsoever they thought would render it distasteful; its friends took it, drugged as it was. Vast amounts of property, many millions, had been invested in manufactures, under the inducements of the act of 1824. Events called loudly, as I thought, for further regulation to secure the degree of protection intended by that act. I was disposed to vote for such regulation, and desired nothing more; but certainly was not to be bantered out of my purpose by a threatened augmentation of duty on molasses, put into the bill for the avowed purpose of making it obnoxious. The vote may have been right or wrong, wise or unwise; but it is little less than absurd to allege against it an inconsistency with opposition to the former law.

"THIS POLICY DID NOT BEGIN WITH US IN NEW ENGLAND"

Sir, as to the general subject of the tariff, I have little now to say. Another opportunity may be presented. I remarked the other day, that this policy did not begin with us in New

England; and yet, sir, New England is charged with vehemence as being favorable, or charged with equal vehemence as being unfavorable, to the tariff policy, just as best suits the time, place, and occasion for making some charge against her. The credulity of the public has been put to its extreme capacity of false impression relative to her conduct in this particular. Through all the South, during the late contest, it was New England policy and a New England administration that were afflicting the country with a tariff beyond all endurance; while on the other side of the Alleghanies even the act of 1828 itself, the very sublimated essence of oppression, according to southern opinions, was pronounced to be one of those blessings for which the West was indebted to the "generous South."

With large investments in manufacturing establishments, and many and various interests connected with and dependent on them, it is not to be expected that New England, any more than other portions of the country, will now consent to any measure destructive or highly dangerous. The duty of the government, at the present moment, would seem to be to preserve, not to destroy; to maintain the position which it has assumed; and, for one, I shall feel it an indispensable obligation to hold it steady, as far as in my power, to that degree of protection which it has undertaken to bestow. No more of the tariff.

Professing to be provoked by what he chose to consider a charge made by me against South Carolina, the honorable member, Mr. President, has taken up a new crusade against New England. Leaving altogether the subject of the public lands, in which his success, perhaps, had been neither distinguished nor satisfactory, and letting go, also, of the topic of the tariff, he sallied forth in a general assault on the opinions, politics, and parties of New England, as they have been exhibited in the last thirty years. This is natural. The "narrow policy" of the public lands had proved a legal settlement in South Carolina, and was not to be removed. The "accursed policy" of the tariff, also, had established the fact of its birth and parentage in the same state. No wonder, therefore, the gentleman wished to carry the war, as he expressed

it, into the enemy's country. Prudently willing to quit these subjects, he was, doubtless, desirous of fastening on others, which could not be transferred south of Mason and Dixon's line. The politics of New England became his theme; and it was in this part of his speech, I think, that he menaced me with such sore discomfiture. Discomfiture! Why, sir, when he attacks anything which I maintain, and overthrows it, when he turns the right or left of any position which I take up, when he drives me from any ground I choose to occupy, he may then talk of discomfiture, but not till that distant day. What has he done? Has he maintained his own charges? Has he proved what he alleged? Has he sustained himself in his attack on the government, and on the history of the North, in the matter of the public lands? Has he disproved a fact, refuted a proposition, weakened an argument, maintained by me? Has he come within beat of drum of any position of mine? O, no; but he has "carried the war into the enemy's country"! Carried the war into the enemy's country! Yes, sir, and what sort of a war has he made of it? Why, sir, he has stretched a dragnet over the whole surface of perished pamphlets, indiscreet sermons, frothy paragraphs, and fuming popular addresses; over whatever the pulpit in its moments of alarm, the press in its heats, and parties in their extravagance, have severally thrown off in times of general excitement and violence. He has thus swept together a mass of such things as, but that they are now old and cold, the public health would have required him rather to leave in their state of dispersion. For a good long hour or two, we had the unbroken pleasure of listening to the honorable member, while he recited with his usual grace and spirit, and with evident high gusto, speeches, pamphlets, addresses, and all the *et ceteras* of the political press, such as warm heads produce in warm times; and such as it would be "discomfiture" indeed for anyone, whose taste did not delight in that sort of reading, to be obliged to peruse. This is his war. This it is to carry war into the enemy's country. It is in an invasion of this sort, that he flatters himself with the expectation of gaining laurels fit to adorn a senator's brow!

Mr. President, I shall not, it will not, I trust, be expected that I should, either now or at any time, separate this farrago into parts, and answer and examine its components. I shall barely bestow upon it all a general remark or two. In the run of forty years, sir, under this Constitution, we have experienced sundry successive violent party contests. Party arose, indeed, with the Constitution itself, and, in some form or other, has attended it through the greater part of its history. Whether any other constitution than the old Articles of Confederation was desirable, was itself a question on which parties divided; if a new constitution were framed, what powers should be given to it was another question; and when it had been formed, what was, in fact, the just extent of the powers actually conferred was a third. Parties, as we know, existed under the first administration, as distinctly marked as those which have manifested themselves at any subsequent period. The contest immediately preceding the political change in 1801, and that, again, which existed at the commencement of the late war, are other instances of party excitement, of something more than usual strength and intensity. In all these conflicts there was, no doubt, much of violence on both and all sides. It would be impossible, if one had a fancy for such employment, to adjust the relative *quantum* of violence between these contending parties. There was enough in each, as must always be expected in popular governments. With a great deal of popular and decorous discussion, there was mingled a great deal, also, of declamation, virulence, crimination, and abuse. In regard to any party, probably, at one of the leading epochs in the history of parties, enough may be found to make out another inflamed exhibition, not unlike that with which the honorable member has edified us. For myself, sir, I shall not rake among the rubbish of bygone times, to see what I can find, or whether I cannot find something by which I can fix a blot on the escutcheon of any state, any party, or any part of the country. General Washington's administration was steadily and zealously maintained, as

we all know, by New England. It was violently opposed elsewhere. We know in what quarter he had the most earnest, constant, and persevering support, in all his great and leading measures. We know where his private and personal character was held in the highest degree of attachment and veneration; and we know, too, where his measures were opposed, his services slighted, and his character vilified. We know, or we might know, if we turned to the journals, who expressed respect, gratitude, and regret, when he retired from the chief magistracy, and who refused to express either respect, gratitude, or regret. I shall not open those journals. Publications more abusive or scurrilous never saw the light, than were sent forth against Washington, and all his leading measures, from presses south of New England. But I shall not look them up. I employ no scavengers, no one is in attendance on me, furnishing such means of retaliation; and if there were, with an ass's load of them, with a bulk as huge as that which the gentleman himself has produced, I would not touch one of them. I see enough of the violence of our own times, to be no way anxious to rescue from forgetfulness the extravagances of times past.

"WHY SHOULD HE . . . ABUSE NEW ENGLAND?"

Besides, what is all this to the present purpose? It has nothing to do with the public lands, in regard to which the attack was begun; and it has nothing to do with those sentiments and opinions which, I have thought, tend to disunion, and all of which the honorable member seems to have adopted himself, and undertaken to defend. New England has, at times, so argues the gentleman, held opinions as dangerous as those which he now holds. Suppose this were so; why should *he* therefore abuse New England? If he finds himself countenanced by acts of hers, how is it that, while he relies on these acts, he covers, or seeks to cover, their authors with reproach? But, sir, if, in the course of forty years, there have been undue effervescences of party in New England, has the same thing happened nowhere else? Party animosity and party outrage, not in New England, but elsewhere, denounced President

Washington, not only as a Federalist, but as a Tory, a British agent, a man who in his high office sanctioned corruption. But does the honorable member suppose, if I had a tender here who should put such an effusion of wickedness and folly into my hand, that I would stand up and read it against the South? Parties ran into great heats again in 1799 and 1800. What was said, sir, or rather what was not said, in those years, against John Adams,²⁷ one of the committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence, and its admitted ablest defender on the floor of Congress? If the gentleman wishes to increase his stores of party abuse and frothy violence, if he has a determined proclivity to such pursuits, there are treasures of that sort south of the Potomac, much to his taste, yet untouched. I shall not touch them.

The parties which divided the country at the commencement of the late war were violent. But then there was violence on both sides, and violence in every state. Minorities and majorities were equally violent. There was no more violence against the war in New England, than in other states; nor any more appearance of violence, except that, owing to a dense population, greater facility of assembling, and more presses, there may have been more in quantity spoken and printed there than in some other places. In the article of sermons, too, New England is somewhat more abundant than South Carolina; and for that reason the chance of finding here and there an exceptionable one may be greater. I hope, too, there are more good ones. Opposition may have been more formidable in New England, as it embraced a larger portion of the whole population; but it was no more unrestrained in principle, or violent in manner. The minorities dealt quite as harshly with their own state governments as the majorities dealt with the administration here. There were presses on both sides, popular meetings on both sides, ay, and pulpits on both sides also. The gentleman's purveyors have only catered for him among the productions of one side. I certainly shall not supply the deficiency by furnishing samples of

the other. I leave to him, and to them, the whole concern.

It is enough for me to say, that if, in any part of this their grateful occupation, if, in all their researches, they find anything in the history of Massachusetts, or New England, or in the proceedings of any legislative or other public body, disloyal to the Union, speaking slightly of its value, proposing to break it up, or recommending nonintercourse with neighboring states, on account of difference of political opinion, then, sir, I give them all up to the honorable gentleman's unrestrained rebuke; expecting, however, that he will extend his buffetings in like manner to all similar proceedings, wherever else found.

"THE GENTLEMAN'S HISTORY OF FEDERALISM"

The gentleman, sir, has spoken at large of former parties, now no longer in being, by their received appellations, and has undertaken to instruct us, not only in the knowledge of their principles, but of their respective pedigrees also. He has ascended to their origin, and run out their genealogies. With most exemplary modesty, he speaks of the party to which he professes to have himself belonged, as the true Pure, the only honest, patriotic party, derived by regular descent, from father to son, from the time of the virtuous Romans! Spreading before us the *family tree* of political parties, he takes especial care to show himself snugly perched on a popular bough! He is wakeful to the expediency of adopting such rules of descent as shall bring him in, to the exclusion of others, as an heir to the inheritance of all public virtue and all true political principle. His party and his opinions are sure to be orthodox; heterodoxy is confined to his opponents. He spoke, sir, of the Federalists, and I thought I saw some eyes begin to open and stare a little, when he ventured on that ground. I expected he would draw his sketches rather lightly, when he looked on the circle round him, and especially if he should cast his thoughts to the high places out of the Senate. Nevertheless, he went back to Rome, *ad annum urbis conditae*, and found the fathers of the Federalists in the primeval aristocrats of that renowned city! He traced the flow of Federal

²⁷ John Adams (1735-1826) was president of the United States, 1797-1801.

blood down through successive ages and centuries, till he brought it into the veins of the American Tories, of whom, by the way, there were twenty in the Carolinas for one in Massachusetts. From the Tories he followed it to the Federalists; and, as the Federal party was broken up, and there was no possibility of transmitting it further on this side the Atlantic, he seems to have discovered that it has gone off collaterally, though against all the canons of descent, into the Ultras of France, and finally become extinguished, like exploded gas, among the adherents of Don Miguel! This, sir, is an abstract of the gentleman's history of Federalism. I am not about to controvert it. It is not, at present, worth the pains of refutation; because, sir, if at this day anyone feels the sin of Federalism lying heavily on his conscience, he can easily procure remission. He may even obtain an indulgence, if he be desirous of repeating the same transgression. It is an affair of no difficulty to get into this same right line of patriotic descent. A man now-a-days is at liberty to choose his political parentage. He may elect his own father. Federalist or not, he may, if he choose, claim to belong to the favored stock, and his claim will be allowed. He may carry back his pretensions just as far as the honorable gentleman himself; nay, he may make himself out the honorable gentleman's cousin, and prove, satisfactorily, that he is descended from the same political great-grandfather. All this is allowable. We all know a process, sir, by which the whole Essex Junto could, in one hour, be all washed white from their ancient Federalism, and come out, every one of them, original Democrats, dyed in the wool! Some of them have actually undergone the operation, and they say it is quite easy. The only inconvenience it occasions, as they tell us, is a slight tendency of the blood to the face, a soft suffusion, which, however, is very transient, since nothing is said by those whom they join calculated to deepen the red on the cheek, but a prudent silence is observed in regard to all the past. Indeed, sir, some smiles of approbation have been bestowed, and some crumbs of comfort have fallen, not a thousand miles from the door of the Hartford Convention itself. And if the author of the Ordinance of 1787 possessed

the other requisite qualifications, there is no knowing, notwithstanding his Federalism, to what heights of favor he might not yet attain.

NO ATTACK ON SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. President, in carrying his warfare, such as it is, into New England, the honorable gentleman all along professes to be acting on the defensive. He chooses to consider me as having assailed South Carolina, and insists that he comes forth only as her champion, and in her defence. Sir, I do not admit that I made any attack whatever on South Carolina. Nothing like it. The honorable member, in his first speech, expressed opinions, in regard to revenue and some other topics, which I heard both with pain and with surprise. I told the gentleman I was aware that such sentiments were entertained *out* of the government, but had not expected to find them advanced in it; that I knew there were persons in the South who speak of our Union with indifference or doubt, taking pains to magnify its evils, and to say nothing of its benefits; that the honorable member himself, I was sure, could never be one of these; and I regretted the expression of such opinions as he had avowed, because I thought their obvious tendency was to encourage feelings of disrespect to the Union, and to impair its strength. This, sir, is the sum and substance of all I said on the subject. And this constitutes the attack which called on the chivalry of the gentleman, in his own opinion, to harry us with such a foray among the party pamphlets and party proceedings of Massachusetts! If he means that I spoke with dissatisfaction or disrespect of the ebullitions of individuals in South Carolina, it is true. But if he means that I assailed the character of the state, her honor, or patriotism, that I reflected on her history or her conduct, he has not the slightest ground for any such assumption. I did not even refer, I think, in my observations, to any collection of individuals. I said nothing of the recent conventions. I spoke in the most guarded and careful manner, and only expressed my regret for the publication of opinions, which I presumed the honorable member disapproved as much as myself. In this, it seems, I was mistaken. I do not remember that

the gentleman has disclaimed any sentiment, or any opinion, of a supposed anti-Union tendency, which on all or any of the recent occasions has been expressed. The whole drift of his speech has been rather to prove, that, in divers times and manners, sentiments equally liable to my objection have been avowed in New England. And one would suppose that his object, in this reference to Massachusetts, was to find a precedent to justify proceedings in the South, were it not for the reproach and contumely with which he labors, all along, to load these his own chosen precedents. By way of defending South Carolina from what he chooses to think an attack on her, he first quotes the example of Massachusetts, and then denounces that example in good set terms. This twofold purpose, not very consistent, one would think, with itself, was exhibited more than once in the course of his speech. He referred, for instance, to the Hartford Convention. Did he do this for authority, or for a topic of reproach? Apparently for both, for he told us that he should find no fault with the mere fact of holding such a convention, and considering and discussing such questions as he supposes were then and there discussed; but what rendered it obnoxious was its being held at the time, and under the circumstances of the country then existing. We were in a war, he said, and the country needed all our aid; the hand of government required to be strengthened, not weakened; and patriotism should have postponed such proceedings to another day. The thing itself, then, is a precedent; the time and manner of it only, a subject of censure.

Now, sir, I go much further, on this point, than the honorable member. Supposing, as the gentleman seems to do, that the Hartford Convention assembled for any such purpose as breaking up the Union, because they thought unconstitutional laws had been passed, or to consult on that subject, or *to calculate the value of the Union*; supposing this to be their purpose, or any part of it, then I say the meeting itself was disloyal, and was obnoxious to censure, whether held in time of peace or time of war, or under whatever circumstances. The material question is the *object*. Is dissolution the *object*? If it be, external circumstances may make it a

more or less aggravated case, but cannot affect the principle. I do not hold, therefore, sir, that the Hartford Convention was pardonable, even to the extent of the gentleman's admission, if its objects were really such as have been imputed to it. Sir, there never was a time, under any degree of excitement, in which the Hartford Convention, or any other convention, could have maintained itself one moment in New England, if assembled for any such purpose as the gentleman says would have been an allowable purpose. To hold conventions to decide constitutional law! To try the binding validity of statutes by votes in a convention! Sir, the Hartford Convention, I presume, would not desire that the honorable gentleman should be their defender or advocate, if he puts their case upon such untenable and extravagant grounds.

Then, sir, the gentleman has no fault to find with these recently promulgated South Carolina opinions. And certainly he need have none; for his own sentiments, as now advanced, and advanced on reflection, as far as I have been able to comprehend them, go the full length of all these opinions. I propose, sir, to say something on these, and to consider how far they are just and constitutional. Before doing that, however, let me observe that the eulogium pronounced by the honorable gentleman on the character of the state of South Carolina, for her revolutionary and other merits, meets my hearty concurrence. I shall not acknowledge that the honorable member goes before me in regard for whatever of distinguished talent, or distinguished character, South Carolina has produced. I claim part of the honor, I partake in the pride, of her great names. I claim them for countrymen, one and all, the Laurenses, the Rutledges, the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Marions, Americans all, whose fame is no more to be hemmed in by state lines, than their talents and patriotism were capable of being circumscribed within the same narrow limits. In their day and generation, they served and honored the country, and the whole country; and their renown is of the treasures of the whole country. Him whose honored name the gentleman himself bears, does he esteem me less capable of gratitude for his patriotism, or sympathy for his sufferings, than if his eyes had first opened

upon the light of Massachusetts, instead of South Carolina? Sir, does he suppose it in his power to exhibit a Carolina name so bright, as to produce envy in my bosom? No, sir, increased gratification and delight, rather. I thank God, that, if I am gifted with little of the spirit which is able to raise mortals to the skies, I have yet none, as I trust, of that other spirit, which would drag angels down. When I shall be found, sir, in my place here in the Senate, or elsewhere, to sneer at public merit, because it happens to spring up beyond the little limits of my own state or neighborhood; when I refuse, for any such cause, or for any cause, the homage due to American talent, to elevated patriotism, to sincere devotion to liberty and the country; or, if I see an uncommon endowment of Heaven, if I see extraordinary capacity and virtue, in any of the South, and if, moved by local prejudice or gangrened by state jealousy, I get up here to abate the tithe of a hair from his just character and just fame, may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth!

Sir, let me recur to pleasing recollections; let me indulge in refreshing remembrance of the past; let me remind you that, in early times, no states cherished greater harmony, both of principle and feeling, than Massachusetts and South Carolina. Would to God that harmony might again return! Shoulder to shoulder they went through the Revolution, hand in hand they stood round the administration of Washington, and felt his own great arm lean on them for support. Unkind feeling, if it exist, alienation, and distrust are the growth, unnatural to such soils, of false principles since sown. They are weeds, the seeds of which that same great arm never scattered.

Mr. President, I shall enter on no encomium upon Massachusetts; she needs none. There she is. Behold her, and judge for yourselves. There is her history; the world knows it by heart. The past, at least, is secure. There is Boston, and Concord, and Lexington, and Bunker Hill; and there they will remain for ever. The bones of her sons, falling in the great struggle for independence, now lie mingled with the soil of every state from New England to Georgia; and there they will lie for ever. And sir, where American liberty raised its first voice, and

where its youth was nurtured and sustained, there it still lives, in the strength of its manhood and full of its original spirit. If discord and disunion shall wound it, if party strife and blind ambition shall hawk at and tear it, if folly and madness, if uneasiness under salutary and necessary restraint, shall succeed in separating it from that Union, by which alone its existence is made sure, it will stand, in the end, by the side of that cradle in which its infancy was rocked; it will stretch forth its arm with whatever of vigor it may still retain over the friends who gather round it; and it will fall at last, if fall it must, amidst the proudest monuments of its own glory, and on the very spot of its origin.

"THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION"

There yet remains to be performed, Mr. President, by far the most grave and important duty, which I feel to be devolved on me by this occasion. It is to state, and to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles of the Constitution under which we are here assembled. I might well have desired that so weighty a task should have fallen into other and abler hands. I could have wished that it should have been executed by those whose character and experience give weight and influence to their opinions, such as cannot possibly belong to mine. But, sir, I have met the occasion, not sought it; and I shall proceed to state my own sentiments, without challenging for them any particular regard, with studied plainness, and as much precision as possible.

I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina to maintain, that it is a right of the state legislatures to interfere, whenever, in their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits, and to arrest the operation of its laws.

I understand him to maintain this right, as a right existing *under* the Constitution, not as a right to overthrow it on the ground of extreme necessity, such as would justify violent revolution.

I understand him to maintain an authority, on the part of the states, thus to interfere, for the purpose of correcting the exercise of power

by the general government, of checking it, and of compelling it to conform to their opinion of the extent of its powers.

I understand him to maintain, that the ultimate power of judging of the constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged exclusively in the general government, or any branch of it; but that, on the contrary, the states may lawfully decide for themselves, and each state for itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government transcends its power.

I understand him to insist, that, if the exigency of the case, in the opinion of any state government, require it, such state government may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.

This is the sum of what I understand from him to be the South Carolina doctrine, and the doctrine which he maintains. I propose to consider it, and compare it with the Constitution. Allow me to say, as a preliminary remark, that I call this the South Carolina doctrine only because the gentleman himself has so denominated it. I do not feel at liberty to say that South Carolina, as a state, has ever advanced these sentiments. I hope she has not, and never may. That a great majority of her people are opposed to the tariff laws, is doubtless true. That a majority, somewhat less than that just mentioned, conscientiously believe these laws unconstitutional, may probably also be true. But that any majority holds to the right of direct state interference at state discretion, the right of nullifying acts of Congress by acts of state legislation, is more than I know, and what I shall be slow to believe.

That there are individuals besides the honorable gentleman who do maintain these opinions, is quite certain. I recollect the recent expression of a sentiment, which circumstances attending its utterance and publication justify us in supposing was not unpremeditated. "The sovereignty of the state, never to be controlled, construed, or decided on but by her own feelings of honorable justice."

[Mr. Hayne here rose and said, that, for the purpose of being clearly understood, he would state that his proposition was in the words of the Virginia resolution, as follows:

That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.

Mr. Webster resumed:]

I am quite aware, Mr. President, of the existence of the resolution which the gentleman read, and has now repeated, and that he relies on it as his authority. I know the source, too, from which it is understood to have proceeded. I need not say that I have much respect for the constitutional opinions of Mr. Madison; they would weigh greatly with me always. But before the authority of his opinion be vouched for the gentleman's proposition, it will be proper to consider what is the fair interpretation of that resolution, to which Mr. Madison is understood to have given his sanction. As the gentleman construes it, it is an authority for him. Possibly, he may not have adopted the right construction. That resolution declares, that, *in the case of the dangerous exercise of powers not granted by the general government, the states may interpose to arrest the progress of the evil.* But how interpose, and what does this declaration purport? Does it mean no more than that there may be extreme cases, in which the people, in any mode of assembling, may resist usurpation, and relieve themselves from a tyrannical government? No one will deny this. Such resistance is not only acknowledged to be just in America, but in England also. Blackstone admits as much, in the theory, and practice, too, of the English constitution. We, sir, who oppose the Carolina doctrine, do not deny that the people may, if they choose, throw off any government when it becomes oppressive and intolerable, and erect a better in its stead. We all know that civil institutions are established for the public benefit, and that when they cease to answer the ends of their existence they may be changed. But I do not understand the doctrine now contended for to be that, which, for the sake of distinction,

we may call the right of revolution. I understand the gentleman to maintain, that, without revolution, without civil commotion, without rebellion, a remedy for supposed abuse and transgression of the powers of the general government lies in a direct appeal to the interference of the state governments.

[Mr. Hayne here rose and said: He did not contend for the mere right of revolution, but for the right of constitutional resistance. What he maintained was, that in case of a plain, palpable violation of the Constitution by the general government, a state may interpose; and that this interposition is constitutional.]

Mr. Webster resumed:]

WHO IS TO DECIDE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY?

So, sir, I understood the gentleman, and am happy to find that I did not misunderstand him. What he contends for is, that it is constitutional to interrupt the administration of the Constitution itself, in the hands of those who are chosen and sworn to administer it, by the direct interference, in form of law, of the states, in virtue of their sovereign capacity. The inherent right in the people to reform their government I do not deny; and they have another right, and that is, to resist unconstitutional laws, without overturning the government. It is no doctrine of mine that unconstitutional laws bind the people. The great question is, whose prerogative is it to decide on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the laws? On that, the main debate hinges. The proposition, that, in case of a supposed violation of the Constitution by Congress, the states have a constitutional right to interfere and annul the law of Congress, is the proposition of the gentleman. I do not admit it. If the gentleman had intended no more than to assert the right of revolution for justifiable cause, he would have said only what all agree to. But I cannot conceive that there can be a middle course, between submission to the laws, when regularly pronounced constitutional, on the one hand, and open resistance, which is revolution or rebellion, on the other. I say, the right of a state to annul a law of Congress cannot be maintained, but on the ground of the inalienable right of man to resist oppression; that is to say, upon the ground of

revolution. I admit that there is an ultimate violent remedy, above the Constitution and in defiance of the Constitution, which may be resorted to when a revolution is to be justified. But I do not admit, that, under the Constitution and in conformity with it, there is any mode in which a state government, as a member of the Union, can interfere and stop the progress of the general government, by force of her own laws, under any circumstances whatever.

This leads us to inquire into the origin of this government and the source of its power. Whose agent is it? Is it the creature of the state legislatures, or the creature of the people? If the government of the United States be the agent of the state governments, then they may control it, provided they can agree in the manner of controlling it; if it be the agent of the people, then the people alone can control it, restrain it, modify, or reform it. It is observable enough, that the doctrine for which the honorable gentleman contends leads him to the necessity of maintaining, not only that this general government is the creature of the states, but that it is the creature of each of the states severally, so that each may assert the power for itself of determining whether it acts within the limits of its authority. It is the servant of four-and-twenty masters, of different wills and different purposes, and yet bound to obey all. This absurdity (for it seems no less) arises from a misconception as to the origin of this government and its true character. It is, sir, the people's Constitution, the people's government, made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the people. The people of the United States have declared that the Constitution shall be the supreme law. We must either admit the proposition, or dispute their authority. The states are, unquestionably, sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law. But the state legislatures, as political bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people. So far as the people have given power to the general government, so far the grant is unquestionably good, and the government holds of the people, and not of the state governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the people. The general government and the state governments derive

their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary, though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary. The national government possesses those powers which it can be shown the people have conferred on it, and no more. All the rest belongs to the state governments, or to the people themselves. So far as the people have restrained state sovereignty, by the expression of their will, in the Constitution of the United States, so far, it must be admitted, state sovereignty is effectually controlled. I do not contend that it is, or ought to be, controlled farther. The sentiment to which I have referred propounds that state sovereignty is only to be controlled by its own "feeling of justice"; that is to say, it is not to be controlled at all, for one who is to follow his own feelings is under no legal control. Now, however men may think this ought to be, the fact is, that the people of the United States have chosen to impose control on state sovereignties. There are those, doubtless, who wish they had been left without restraint; but the Constitution has ordered the matter differently. To make war, for instance, is an exercise of sovereignty; but the Constitution declares that no state shall make war. To coin money is another exercise of sovereign power, but no state is at liberty to coin money. Again, the Constitution says that no sovereign state shall be so sovereign as to make a treaty. These prohibitions, it must be confessed, are a control on the state sovereignty of South Carolina, as well as of the other states, which does not arise "from her own feelings of honorable justice." The opinion referred to, therefore, is in defiance of the plainest provisions of the Constitution.

"THE CAROLINA DOCTRINE"

There are other proceedings of public bodies which have already been alluded to, and to which I refer again, for the purpose of ascertaining more fully what is the length and breadth of that doctrine, denominated the Carolina doctrine, which the honorable member has now stood up on this floor to maintain. In one of them I find it resolved, that "the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff designed to pro-

mote one branch of industry at the expense of others, is contrary to the meaning and intention of the federal compact; and such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, by a determined majority, wielding the general government beyond the limits of its delegated powers, as calls upon the states which compose the suffering minority, in their sovereign capacity, to exercise the powers which, as sovereigns, necessarily devolve upon them, when their compact is violated."

Observe, sir, that this resolution holds the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense of another, to be such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, as calls upon the states, in their sovereign capacity, to interfere by their own authority. This denunciation, Mr. President, you will please to observe, includes our old tariff of 1816, as well as all others; because that was established to promote the interest of the manufacturers of cotton, to the manifest and admitted injury of the Calcutta cotton trade. Observe, again, that all the qualifications are here rehearsed and charged upon the tariff, which are necessary to bring the case within the gentleman's proposition. The tariff is a usurpation; it is a dangerous usurpation; it is a palpable usurpation; it is a deliberate usurpation. It is such a usurpation, therefore, as calls upon the states to exercise their right of interference. Here is a case, then, within the gentleman's principles, and all his qualifications of his principles. It is a case for action. The Constitution is plainly, dangerously, palpably, and deliberately violated; and the states must interpose their own authority to arrest the law. Let us suppose the state of South Carolina to express this same opinion, by the voice of her legislature. That would be very imposing; but what then? Is the voice of one state conclusive? It so happens that, at the very moment when South Carolina resolves that the tariff laws are unconstitutional, Pennsylvania and Kentucky resolve exactly the reverse. *They* hold those laws to be both highly proper and strictly constitutional. And now, sir, how does the honorable member propose to deal with this case? How does he relieve us from this difficulty, upon any principle of his? His construction

gets us into it; how does he propose to get us out?

In Carolina, the tariff is a palpable, deliberate usurpation; Carolina, therefore, may nullify it, and refuse to pay the duties. In Pennsylvania, it is both clearly constitutional and highly expedient; and there the duties are to be paid. And yet we live under a government of uniform laws, and under a Constitution too, which contains an express provision, as it happens, that all duties shall be equal in all the states. Does not this approach absurdity?

THERE MUST BE A POWER TO SETTLE SUCH QUESTIONS

If there be no power to settle such questions, independent of either of the states, is not the whole Union a rope of sand? Are we not thrown back again, precisely, upon the old Confederation?

It is too plain to be argued. Four-and-twenty interpreters of constitutional law, each with a power to decide for itself, and none with authority to bind anybody else, and this constitutional law the only bond of their union! What is such a state of things but a mere connection during pleasure, or, to use the phraseology of the times, *during feeling*? And that feeling, too, not the feeling of the people, who established the Constitution, but the feeling of the state governments.

In another of the South Carolina addresses, having premised that the crisis requires "all the concentrated energy of passion," an attitude of open resistance to the laws of the Union is advised. Open resistance to the laws, then, is the constitutional remedy, the conservative power of the state, which the South Carolina doctrines teach for the redress of political evils, real or imaginary. And its authors further say, that, appealing with confidence to the Constitution itself, to justify their opinions, they cannot consent to try their accuracy by the courts of justice. In one sense, indeed, sir, this is assuming an attitude of open resistance in favor of liberty. But what sort of liberty? The liberty of establishing their own opinions, in defiance of the opinions of all others; the liberty of judging and of deciding exclusively themselves, in a matter in which others have as much right to judge and decide as they; the liberty of placing

their own opinions above the judgment of all others, above the laws, and above the Constitution. This is their liberty, and this is the fair result of the proposition contended for by the honorable gentleman. Or, it may be more properly said, it is identical with it rather than a result from it.

In the same publication we find the following: "Previously to our Revolution, when the arm of oppression was stretched over New England, where did our Northern brethren meet with a braver sympathy than that which sprung from the bosoms of Carolinians? We had no extortion, no oppression, no collision with the king's ministers, no navigation interests springing up, in envious rivalry of England."

This seems extraordinary language. South Carolina no collision with the king's ministers in 1775! No extortion! No oppression! But, sir, it is also most significant language. Does any man doubt the purpose for which it was penned? Can anyone fail to see that it was designed to raise in the reader's mind the question, whether, *at this time*—that is to say, in 1828—South Carolina has any collision with the king's ministers, any oppression, or extortion, to fear from England? whether, in short, England is not as naturally the friend of South Carolina as New England, with her navigation interests springing up in envious rivalry of England?

Is it not strange, sir, that an intelligent man in South Carolina, in 1828, should thus labor to prove that, in 1775, there was no hostility, no cause of war, between South Carolina and England? That she had no occasion, in reference to her own interest, or from a regard to her own welfare, to take up arms in the revolutionary contest? Can anyone account for the expression of such strange sentiments, and their circulation through the state, otherwise than by supposing the object to be what I have already intimated, to raise the question, if they had no "*collision*" (mark the expression) with the ministers of King George the Third, in 1775, what *collision* have they, in 1828, with the ministers of King George the Fourth? What is there now in the existing state of things, to separate Carolina from *Old*, more, or rather, than from *New* England?

Resolutions, sir, have been recently passed by the legislature of South Carolina. I need not refer to them; they go no farther than the honorable gentleman himself has gone, and I hope not so far. I content myself, therefore, with debating the matter with him.

And now, sir, what I have first to say on this subject is, that at no time, and under no circumstances, has New England, or any state in New England, or any respectable body of persons in New England, or any public man of standing in New England, put forth such a doctrine as this Carolina doctrine.

The gentleman has found no case, he can find none, to support his own opinions by New England authority. New England has studied the Constitution in other schools, and under other teachers. She looks upon it with other regards, and deems more highly and reverently both of its just authority and its utility and excellence. The history of her legislative proceedings may be traced. The ephemeral effusions of temporary bodies, called together by the excitement of the occasion, may be hunted up; they have been hunted up. The opinions and votes of her public men, in and out of Congress, may be explored. It will all be in vain. The Carolina doctrine can derive from her neither countenance nor support. She rejects it now; she always did reject it; and till she loses her senses, she always will reject it. The honorable member has referred to expressions on the subject of the embargo law, made in this place, by an honorable and venerable gentleman,²⁸ now favoring us with his presence. He quotes that distinguished senator as saying, that, in his judgment, the embargo law was unconstitutional, and that therefore, in his opinion, the people were not bound to obey it. That, sir, is perfectly constitutional language. *An unconstitutional law is not binding; but then it does not rest with a resolution or a law of a state legislature to decide whether an act of Congress be or be not constitutional.* An unconstitutional act of Congress would not bind the people of this District, although they have no legislature to interfere in their behalf; and,

on the other hand, a constitutional law of Congress does bind the citizens of every state, although all their legislatures should undertake to annul it by act or resolution. The venerable Connecticut senator is a constitutional lawyer, of sound principles and enlarged knowledge; a statesman practised and experienced, bred in the company of Washington, and holding just views upon the nature of our governments. He believed the embargo unconstitutional, and so did others; but what then? Who did he suppose was to decide that question? The state legislatures? Certainly not. No such sentiment ever escaped his lips.

Let us follow up, sir, this New England opposition to the embargo laws; let us trace it, till we discern the principle which controlled and governed New England throughout the whole course of that opposition. We shall then see what similarity there is between the New England school of constitutional opinions, and this modern Carolina school. The gentleman, I think, read a petition from some single individual addressed to the legislature of Massachusetts, asserting the Carolina doctrine; that is, the right of state interference to arrest the laws of the Union. The fate of that petition shows the sentiment of the legislature. It met no favor. The opinions of Massachusetts were very different. They had been expressed in 1798, in answer to the resolutions of Virginia, and she did not depart from them, nor bend them to the times. Misgoverned, wronged, oppressed, as she felt herself to be, she still held fast her integrity to the Union. The gentleman may find in her proceedings much evidence of dissatisfaction with the measures of government, and great and deep dislike to the embargo; all this makes the case so much the stronger for her; for, notwithstanding all this dissatisfaction and dislike, she still claimed no right to sever the bonds of the Union. There was heat, and there was anger in her political feeling. Be it so; but neither her heat nor her anger betrayed her into infidelity to the government. The gentleman labors to prove that she disliked the embargo as much as South Carolina dislikes the tariff, and expressed her dislike as strongly. Be it so; but did she propose the Carolina remedy? did she threaten to interfere, by state authority, to annul the

²⁸ James Hillhouse of Connecticut (1754-1832) served in the Senate, 1796-1810.

laws of the Union? That is the question for the gentleman's consideration.

"WHO IS TO JUDGE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT?"

No doubt, sir, a great majority of the people of New England conscientiously believed the embargo law of 1807 unconstitutional; as conscientiously, certainly, as the people of South Carolina hold that opinion of the tariff. They reasoned thus: Congress has power to regulate commerce; but here is a law, they said, stopping all commerce, and stopping it indefinitely. The law is perpetual; that is, it is not limited in point of time, and must of course continue until it shall be repealed by some other law. It is as perpetual, therefore, as the law against treason or murder. Now, is this regulating commerce, or destroying it? Is it guiding, controlling, giving the rule to commerce, as a subsisting thing, or is it putting an end to it altogether? Nothing is more certain, than that a majority in New England deemed this law a violation of the Constitution. The very case required by the gentleman to justify state interference had then arisen. Massachusetts believed this law to be "a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not granted by the Constitution." Deliberate it was, for it was long continued; palpable she thought it, as no words in the Constitution gave the power, and only a construction, in her opinion most violent, raised it; dangerous it was, since it threatened utter ruin to her most important interests. Here, then, was a Carolina case. How did Massachusetts deal with it? It was, as she thought, a plain, manifest, palpable violation of the Constitution, and it brought ruin to her doors. Thousands of families, and hundreds of thousands of individuals, were beggared by it. While she saw and felt all this, she saw and felt also, that, as a measure of national policy, it was perfectly futile; that the country was no way benefited by that which caused so much individual distress; that it was efficient only for the production of evil, and all that evil inflicted on ourselves. In such a case, under such circumstances, how did Massachusetts demean herself? Sir, she remonstrated, she memorialized, she addressed herself to the general government, not exactly "with the concen-

trated energy of passion," but with her own strong sense, and the energy of sober conviction. But she did not interpose the arm of her own power to arrest the law, and break the embargo. Far from it. Her principles bound her to two things; and she followed her principles, lead where they might. First, to submit to every constitutional law of Congress, and secondly, if the constitutional validity of the law be doubted, to refer that question to the decision of the proper tribunals. The first principle is vain and ineffectual without the second. A majority of us in New England believed the embargo law unconstitutional; but the great question was, and always will be in such cases, who is to decide this? Who is to judge between the people and the government? And, sir, it is quite plain, that the Constitution of the United States confers on the government itself, to be exercised by its appropriate department, and under its own responsibility to the people, this power of deciding ultimately and conclusively upon the just extent of its own authority. If this had not been done, we should not have advanced a single step beyond the old Confederation.

Being fully of opinion that the embargo law was unconstitutional, the people of New England were yet equally clear in the opinion, (it was a matter they did doubt upon) that the question, after all, must be decided by the judicial tribunals of the United States. Before those tribunals, therefore, they brought the question. Under the provisions of the law, they had given bonds to millions in amount, and which were alleged to be forfeited. They suffered the bonds to be sued, and thus raised the question. In the old-fashioned way of settling disputes, they went to law. The case came to hearing, and solemn argument; and he who espoused their cause, and stood up for them against the validity of the Embargo Act, was none other than that great man, of whom the gentleman has made honorable mention, Samuel Dexter.²⁹ He was then, sir, in the fulness of his knowledge, and the maturity of his strength. He had retired from long and distinguished public service here, to the renewed pursuit of professional duties,

²⁹ Samuel Dexter (1761-1816) served in the Senate, 1799-1800.

carrying with him all that enlargement and expansion, all the new strength and force, which an acquaintance with the more general subjects discussed in the national councils is capable of adding to professional attainment, in a mind of true greatness and comprehension. He was a lawyer, and he was also a statesman. He had studied the Constitution, when he filled public station, that he might defend it; he had examined its principles that he might maintain them. More than all men, or at least as much as any man, he was attached to the general government and to the union of the states. His feelings and opinions all ran in that direction. A question of constitutional law, too, was, of all subjects, that one which was best suited to his talents and learning. Aloof from technicality, and unfettered by artificial rule, such a question gave opportunity for that deep and clear analysis, that mighty grasp of principle, which so much distinguished his higher efforts. His very statement was argument; his inference seemed demonstration. The earnestness of his own conviction wrought conviction in others. One was convinced, and believed, and assented, because it was gratifying, delightful, to think, and feel, and believe, in unison with an intellect of such evident superiority.

Mr. Dexter, sir, such as I have described him, argued the New England cause. He put into his effort his whole heart, as well as all the powers of his understanding; for he had avowed, in the most public manner, his entire concurrence with his neighbors on the point in dispute. He argued the cause; it was lost, and New England submitted. The established tribunals pronounced the law constitutional, and New England acquiesced. Now, sir, is not this the exact opposite of the doctrine of the gentleman from South Carolina? According to him, instead of referring to the judicial tribunals, we should have broken up the embargo by laws of our own; we should have repealed it, *quoad* New England; for we had a strong, palpable, and oppressive case. Sir, we believed the embargo unconstitutional; but still that was matter of opinion, and who was to decide it? We thought it a clear case; but, nevertheless, we did not take the law into our own hands, because we did not wish to bring about a revolution, nor to

break up the Union; for I maintain, that between submission to the decision of the constituted tribunals, and revolution, or disunion, there is no middle ground; there is no ambiguous condition, half allegiance and half rebellion. And, sir, how futile, how very futile it is, to admit the right of state interference, and then attempt to save it from the character of unlawful resistance, by adding terms of qualification to the causes and occasions, leaving all these qualifications, like the case itself, in the discretion of the state governments. It must be a clear case, it is said, a deliberate case, a palpable case, a dangerous case. But then the state is still left at liberty to decide for herself what is clear, what is deliberate, what is palpable, what is dangerous. Do adjectives and epithets avail anything?

Sir, the human mind is so constituted, that the merits of both sides of a controversy appear very clear, and very palpable, to those who respectively espouse them; and both sides usually grow clearer as the controversy advances. South Carolina sees unconstitutionality in the tariff; she sees oppression there also, and she sees danger. Pennsylvania, with a vision not less sharp, looks at the same tariff, and sees no such thing in it; she sees it all constitutional, all useful, all safe. The faith of South Carolina is strengthened by opposition, and she now not only sees, but *resolves*, that the tariff is palpably unconstitutional, oppressive, and dangerous; but Pennsylvania, not to be behind her neighbors, and equally willing to strengthen her own faith by a confident asseveration, *resolves*, also, and gives to every warm affirmative of South Carolina, a plain, downright, Pennsylvania negative. South Carolina, to show the strength and unity of her opinion, brings her assembly to a unanimity, within seven voices; Pennsylvania, not to be outdone in this respect any more than in others, reduces her dissentient fraction to a single vote. Now, sir, again, I ask the gentleman, What is to be done? Are these states both right? Is he bound to consider them both right? If not, which is in the wrong? or rather, which has the best right to decide? And if he, and if I, are not to know what the Constitution means, and what it is, till those two state legislatures, and the twenty-two others, shall agree in its

construction, what have we sworn to, when we have sworn to maintain it? I was forcibly struck, sir, with one reflection, as the gentleman went on in his speech. He quoted Mr. Madison's resolutions, to prove that a state may interfere, in a case of deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not granted. The honorable member supposes the tariff law to be such an exercise of power; and that consequently a case has arisen in which the state may, if it see fit, interfere by its own law. Now it so happens, nevertheless, that Mr. Madison deems this same tariff law quite constitutional. Instead of a clear and palpable violation, it is, in his judgment, no violation at all. So that, while they use his authority for a hypothetical case, they reject it in the very case before them. All this, sir, shows the inherent futility, I had almost used a stronger word, of conceding this power of interference to the state, and then attempting to secure it from abuse by imposing qualifications of which the states themselves are to judge. One of two things is true; either the laws of the Union are beyond the discretion and beyond the control of the states; or else we have no constitution of general government, and are thrust back again to the days of the Confederation.

Let me here say, sir, that if the gentleman's doctrine had been received and acted upon in New England, in the times of the embargo and nonintercourse, we should probably not now have been here. The government would very likely have gone to pieces, and crumbled into dust. No stronger case can ever arise than existed under those laws; no states can ever entertain a clearer conviction than the New England states then entertained; and if they had been under the influence of that heresy of opinion, as I must call it, which the honorable member espouses, this Union would, in all probability, have been scattered to the four winds. I ask the gentleman, therefore, to apply his principles to that case; I ask him to come forth and declare, whether, in his opinion, the New England states would have been justified in interfering to break up the embargo system under the conscientious opinions which they held upon it? Had they a right to annul that law? Does he admit or deny? If what is thought palpably unconsti-

tutional in South Carolina justifies that state in arresting the progress of the law, tell me whether that which was thought palpably unconstitutional also in Massachusetts would have justified her in doing the same thing. Sir, I deny the whole doctrine. It has not a foot of ground in the Constitution to stand on. No public man of reputation ever advanced it in Massachusetts in the warmest times, or could maintain himself upon it there at any time.

"THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798"

I wish now, sir, to make a remark upon the Virginia resolutions of 1798. I cannot undertake to say how these resolutions were understood by those who passed them. Their language is not a little indefinite. In the case of the exercise by Congress of a dangerous power not granted to them, the resolutions assert the right, on the part of the state, to interfere and arrest the progress of the evil. This is susceptible of more than one interpretation. It may mean no more than that the states may interfere by complaint and remonstrance, or by proposing to the people an alteration of the federal Constitution. This would all be quite unobjectionable. Or it may be that no more is meant than to assert the general right of revolution, as against all governments, in cases of intolerable oppression. This no one doubts, and this, in my opinion, is all that he who framed the resolutions could have meant by it; for I shall not readily believe that he was ever of opinion that a state, under the Constitution and in conformity with it, could, upon the ground of her own opinion of its unconstitutionality, however clear and palpable she might think the case, annul a law of Congress, so far as it should operate on herself, by her own legislative power.

I must now beg to ask, sir, whence is this supposed right of the states derived? Where do they find the power to interfere with the laws of the Union? Sir, the opinion which the honorable gentleman maintains is a notion founded in a total misapprehension, in my judgment, of the origin of this government, and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold it to be a popular government, erected by the people; those who administer it, responsible to the people;

and itself capable of being amended and modified, just as the people may choose it should be. It is as popular, just as truly emanating from the people, as the state governments. It is created for one purpose; the state governments for another. It has its own powers; they have theirs. There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest the operation of their laws. We are here to administer a Constitution emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the creature of the state governments. It is of no moment to the argument, that certain acts of the state legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. That is not one of their original state powers, a part of the sovereignty of the state. It is a duty which the people, by the Constitution itself, have imposed on the state legislatures; and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit. So they have left the choice of president with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition that this whole government, president, Senate, and House of Representatives, is a popular government. It leaves it still all its popular character. The governor of a state (in some of the states) is chosen, not directly by the people, but by those who are chosen by the people, for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of electing a governor. Is the government of the state, on that account, not a popular government? This government, sir, is the independent offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of state legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on state sovereignties. The states cannot now make war; they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin money. If this Constitution, sir, be the creature of state legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the volitions of its creators.

The people, then, sir, erected this government. They gave it a Constitution, and in that

Constitution they have enumerated the powers which they bestow on it. They have made it a limited government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it to the exercise of such powers as are granted; and all others, they declare, are reserved to the states or the people. But, sir, they have not stopped here. If they had, they would have accomplished but half their work. No definition can be so clear, as to avoid possibility of doubt; no limitation so precise, as to exclude all uncertainty. Who, then, shall construe this grant of the people? Who shall interpret their will, where it may be supposed they have left it doubtful? With whom do they repose this ultimate right of deciding on the powers of the government? Sir, they have settled all this in the fullest manner. They have left it with the government itself, in its appropriate branches. Sir, the very chief end, the main design, for which the whole Constitution was framed and adopted, was to establish a government that should not be obliged to act through state agency, or depend on state opinion and state discretion. The people had had quite enough of that kind of government under the Confederation. Under that system, the legal action, the application of law to individuals, belonged exclusively to the states. Congress could only recommend; their acts were not of binding force, till the states had adopted and sanctioned them. Are we in that condition still? Are we yet at the mercy of state discretion and state construction? Sir, if we are, then vain will be our attempt to maintain the Constitution under which we sit.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE FINAL DECISION

But, sir, the people have wisely provided, in the Constitution itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of constitutional law. There are in the Constitution grants of powers to Congress, and restrictions on these powers. There are, also, prohibitions on the states. Some authority must, therefore, necessarily exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The Constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and

established that authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By declaring, sir, that *"the Constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."*

This, sir, was the first great step. By this the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so will it. No state law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the Constitution, or any law of the United States passed in pursuance of it. But who shall decide this question of interference? To whom lies the last appeal? This, sir, the Constitution itself decides also, by declaring, *"that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States."* These two provisions cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of the arch! With these it is a government; without them it is a confederation. In pursuance of these clear and express provisions, Congress established, at its very first session, in the judicial act, a mode for carrying them into full effect, and for bringing all questions of constitutional power to the final decision of the Supreme Court. It then, sir, became a government. It then had the means of self-protection; and but for this, it would, in all probability, have been now among things which are past. Having constituted the government, and declared its powers, the people have further said, that, since somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the government shall itself decide; subject, always, like other popular governments, to its responsibility to the people. And now, sir, I repeat, how is it that a state legislature acquires any power to interfere? Who, or what, gives them the right to say to the people, "We, who are your agents and servants for one purpose, will undertake to decide, that your other agents and servants, appointed by you for another purpose, have transcended the authority you gave them!" The reply would be, I think, not impertinent, "Who made you a judge over another's servants? To their own masters they stand or fall."

Sir, I deny this power of state legislatures altogether. It cannot stand the test of examination. Gentlemen may say, that, in an extreme case, a state government might protect the

people from intolerable oppression. Sir, in such a case, the people might protect themselves, without the aid of the state governments. Such a case warrants revolution. It must make, when it comes, a law for itself. A nullifying act of a state legislature cannot alter the case, nor make resistance any more lawful. In maintaining these sentiments, sir, I am but asserting the rights of the people. I state what they have declared, and insist on their right to declare it. They have chosen to repose this power in the general government, and I think it my duty to support it, like other constitutional powers.

For myself, sir, I do not admit the competency of South Carolina, or any other state, to prescribe my constitutional duty; or to settle, between me and the people, the validity of laws of Congress, for which I have voted. I decline her umpirage. I have not sworn to support the Constitution according to her construction of its clauses. I have not stipulated, by my oath of office or otherwise, to come under any responsibility, except to the people, and those whom they have appointed to pass upon the question, whether laws, supported by my votes, conform to the Constitution of the country. And, sir, if we look to the general nature of the case, could anything have been more preposterous, than to make a government for the whole Union, and yet leave its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen or twenty-four interpretations? Instead of one tribunal, established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all, shall constitutional questions be left to four-and-twenty popular bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of others; and each at liberty, too, to give a new construction on every new election of its own members? Would anything, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution of all principle, be fit to be called a government? No, sir. It should not be denominated a Constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics for everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be adequate to any practical good, or fit for any country to live under.

To avoid all possibility of being misunderstood, allow me to repeat again, in the fullest

manner, that I claim no powers for the government by forced or unfair construction. I admit that it is a government of strictly limited powers; of enumerated, specified, and particularized powers; and that whatsoever is not granted, is withheld. But notwithstanding all this, and however the grant of powers may be expressed, its limit and extent may yet, in some cases, admit of doubt; and the general government would be good for nothing, it would be incapable of long existing, if some mode had not been provided in which those doubts, as they should arise, might be peaceably, but authoritatively, solved.

THESE DOCTRINES LEAD TO DISUNION

And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman's doctrine a little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable *modus operandi*. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell *how* it is to be done, and I wish to be informed *how* this state interference is to be put in practice, without violence, bloodshed, and rebellion. We will take the existing case of the tariff law. South Carolina is said to have made up her opinion upon it. If we do not repeal it (as we probably shall not), she will then apply to the case the remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring the several acts of Congress, usually called the tariff laws, null and void, so far as they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. So far, all is a paper transaction, and easy enough. But the collector at Charleston is collecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws. He, therefore, must be stopped. The collector will seize the goods if the tariff duties are not paid. The state authorities will undertake their rescue, the marshal, with his posse, will come to the collector's aid, and here the contest begins. The militia of the state will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, sir, under a very gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member himself commands the militia of that part of the state. He will raise the NULLIFYING ACT on his standard, and spread it out as his banner! It will have a preamble, setting forth, that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and danger-

ous violations of the Constitution! He will proceed, with this banner flying, to the customhouse in Charleston,

All the while,
Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds.

Arrived at the customhouse, he will tell the collector that he must collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance, considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But, sir, the collector would not, probably, desist, at his bidding. He would show him the law of Congress, the treasury instruction, and his own oath of office. He would say, he should perform his duty, come what come might.

Here would ensue a pause; for they say that a certain stillness precedes the tempest. The trumpeter would hold his breath awhile, and before all this military array should fall on the customhouse, collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those composing it would request of their gallant commander in chief to be informed a little upon the point of law; for they have, doubtless, a just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone³⁰ and the Constitution, as well as Turenne³¹ and Vauban.³² They would ask him, therefore, something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire, whether it was not somewhat dangerous to resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out, after all, that the law *was constitutional*? He would answer, of course, treason. No lawyer could give any other answer. John Fries,³³ he would tell them, had learned that, some years ago. How, then, they would ask, do

³⁰ Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) wrote *Commentaries on the Laws of England*.

³¹ Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne (1611-1675), a soldier who commanded the French armies.

³² Sébastien de Vauban (1633-1707), a French military engineer who wrote about sieges and fortifications.

³³ John Fries (1750-1818) led an uprising in Pennsylvania against a federal property tax in 1798. He was convicted of treason and sentenced to death but was pardoned by President John Adams.

you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish. How do you propose to defend us? "Look at my floating banner," he would reply; "see there the *nullifying law*!" Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they would then say, that, if we should be indicted for treason, that same floating banner of yours would make a good plea in bar? "South Carolina is a sovereign state," he would reply. That is true; but would the judge admit our plea? "These tariff laws," he would repeat, "are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, dangerously." That may all be so; but if the tribunal should not happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the ground! After all, that is a sort of hemp tax worse than any part of the tariff.

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma, like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, "Defend yourselves with your bayonets"; and this is war—civil war.

Direct collision, therefore, between force and force, is the unavoidable result of that remedy for the revision of unconstitutional laws which the gentleman contends for. It must happen in the very first case to which it is applied. Is not this the plain result? To resist by force the execution of a law, generally, is treason. Can the courts of the United States take notice of the indulgence of a state to commit treason? The common saying, that a state cannot commit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. Can she authorize others to do it? If John Fries had produced an act of Pennsylvania, annulling the law of Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will, these doctrines go the length of revolution. They are incompatible with any peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to disunion and civil commotion; and therefore it is, that at their commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable men, and in a tangible form, I enter my public protest against them all.

The honorable gentleman argues, that if this government be the sole judge of the extent of its own powers, whether that right of judging be in Congress or the Supreme Court, it equally subverts state sovereignty. This the gentleman sees, or thinks he sees, although he cannot perceive how the right of judging, in this matter, if left to the exercise of state legislatures, has any tendency to subvert the government of the Union. The gentleman's opinion may be, that the right *ought not* to have been lodged with the general government; he may like better such a constitution as we should have under the right of state interference; but I ask him to meet me on the plain matter of fact. I ask him to meet me on the Constitution itself. I ask him if the power is not found there, clearly and visibly found there?

But, sir, what is this danger, and what are the grounds of it? Let it be remembered, that the Constitution of the United States is not unalterable. It is to continue in its present form no longer than the people who established it shall choose to continue it. If they shall become convinced that they have made an injudicious or inexpedient partition and distribution of power between the state governments and the general government, they can alter that distribution at will.

If anything be found in the national Constitution, either by original provision or subsequent interpretation, which ought not to be in it, the people know how to get rid of it. If any construction, unacceptable to them, be established, so as to become practically a part of the Constitution, they will amend it, at their own sovereign pleasure. But while the people choose to maintain it as it is, while they are satisfied with it, and refuse to change it, who has given, or who can give, to the state legislatures a right to alter it, either by interference, construction, or otherwise? Gentlemen do not seem to recollect that the people have any power to do anything for themselves. They imagine there is no safety for them, any longer than they are under the close guardianship of the state legislatures. Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the general Constitution, to these hands. They have required other security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust

themselves, first, to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction as the government themselves, in doubtful cases, should put on their own powers, under their oaths of office, and subject to their responsibility to them; just as the people of a state trust their own state governments with a similar power. Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and agents whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which, in order that it might be trustworthy, they have made as respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as was practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity, or high expediency, on their known and admitted power to alter or amend the Constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out defects or imperfections. And, finally, the people of the United States have at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized any state legislature to construe or interpret *their* high instrument of government; much less, to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and operation.

"THE PEOPLE HAVE PRESERVED . . . THEIR . . .
CONSTITUTION"

If, sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they have done, their constitution could neither have been preserved, nor would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being as its enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every state but as a poor dependent on state permission. It must borrow leave to be; and will be, no longer than state pleasure, or state discretion, sees fit to grant the indulgence, and to prolong its poor existence.

But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people have preserved this, their own chosen Constitution, for forty years, and have seen their happiness, prosperity, and renown grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength. They are now, generally

strongly attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined, NULLIFIED, it will not be, if we, and those who shall succeed us here, as agents and representatives of the people, shall conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust, faithfully to preserve, and wisely to administer it.

Mr. President, I have thus stated the reasons of my dissent to the doctrines which have been advanced and maintained. I am conscious of having detained you and the Senate much too long. I was drawn into the debate with no previous deliberation, such as is suited to the discussion of so grave and important a subject. But it is a subject of which my heart is full, and I have not been willing to suppress the utterance of its spontaneous sentiments. I cannot, even now, persuade myself to relinquish it, without expressing once more my deep conviction, that since it respects nothing less than the Union of the states, it is of most vital and essential importance to the public happiness. I profess, sir, in my career hitherto, to have kept steadily in view the prosperity and honor of the whole country, and the preservation of our federal Union. It is to that Union we owe our safety at home, and our consideration and dignity abroad. It is to that Union that we are chiefly indebted for whatever makes us most proud of our country. That Union we reached only by the discipline of our virtues in the severe school of adversity. It had its origin in the necessities of disordered finance, prostrate commerce, and ruined credit. Under its benign influences, these great interests immediately awoke, as from the dead, and sprang forth with newness of life. Every year of its duration has teemed with fresh proofs of its utility and its blessings; and although our territory has stretched out wider and wider, and our population spread farther and farther, they have not outrun its protection or its benefits. It has been to us all a copious fountain of national, social, and personal happiness.

I have not allowed myself, sir, to look beyond the Union, to see what might lie hidden in the dark recess behind. I have not coolly weighed the chances of preserving liberty when the bonds that unite us together shall be broken

asunder. I have not accustomed myself to hang over the precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom the depth of the abyss below; nor could I regard him as a safe counsellor in the affairs of this government, whose thoughts should be mainly bent on considering, not how the Union may be best preserved, but how tolerable might be the condition of the people when it should be broken up and destroyed. While the Union lasts, we have high, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children. Beyond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that in my day, at least, that curtain may not rise! God grant that on my vision never may be opened what lies behind! When my eyes shall be turned to behold for the last time the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glo-

rious Union; on states dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured, bearing for its motto, no such miserable interrogatory as "What is all this worth?" nor those other words of delusion and folly, "Liberty first and Union afterwards"; but everywhere, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart—Liberty *and* Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!